C.R.C.P. 65

History

Source: (b) amended and effective June 28, 2007; (b) and (i) amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b). Cross references: For a temporary injunction in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or allocation of parental responsibilities, see § 14-10-108, C.R.S. ANNOTATION I. General Consideration. II. Preliminary Injunction. III. Temporary Restraining Order. IV. Security. V. Form and Scope. VI. Mandatory Decree. VII. When Relief Granted. VIII. When Inapplicable. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Law reviews. For article, ‘‘Notes on Pro- posed Amendments to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure’’, see 27 Dicta 165 (1950). For ar- ticle, ‘‘Injunctions and Receivers: Rules 65 and 66’’, see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 594 (1951). For article, ‘‘Amendments to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure’’, see 28 Dicta 242 (1951). For article, ‘‘One Y ear Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals’’, see 37 Dicta 21 (1960). For ar- ticle, ‘‘One Y ear Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals’’, see 38 Dicta 133 (1961). Annotator’s note. Since this rule is similar to § 159 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was supplanted by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, relevant cases construing that section have been included in the annota- tions to this rule. Equity will not intervene where one has a plain and adequate remedy at law. Am. In- vestors Life Ins. Co. v. Green Shield Plan, Inc., 145 Colo. 188, 358 P.2d 473 (1960). Such is the case where everything that a plaintiff asserts is measurable and compensable in money and the evidence shows that defen- dant is amply able to respond to a money judg- ment and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts. Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Green Shield Plan, Inc., 145 Colo. 188, 358 P.2d 473 (1960). Where there is an adequate legal remedy which provides for the orderly termination of a nonconforming use, an injunction which is un- duly harsh in its application will not be allowed to be used as a substitute for those legal means of phasing out the nonconforming use. Hobbs v. Smith, 177 Colo. 299, 493 P.2d 1352 (1972). Injunction may not be obtained to restrain commission of a crime. Am. Television & Communications Corp. v. Manning, 651 P.2d 440 (Colo. App. 1982). The power to issue injunction should be exercised with great discretion. The writ of injunction is the strong arm of the court and, to render its operation benign and useful, the power to issue it should be exercised with great discretion and when necessity requires it. McLean v. Farmers’ Highline Canal & Reser- voir Co., 44 Colo. 184, 98 P. 16 (1908). Trial courts have considerable latitude in injunction cases. Brennan v. Monson, 97 Colo. 448, 50 P.2d 534 (1935). If convinced that a plaintiff should comply with certain conditions in order that equity might be done between the parties, such condi- tions may be prescribed, and compliance there- with required as a prerequisite to the granting of injunctive relief. Brennan v. Monson, 97 Colo. 448, 50 P.2d 534 (1935). Prohibition for failure to comply with this rule. When an inferior court exceeds its juris- diction by issuing injunctive orders without complying with the provisions of this rule, re- lief in the nature of prohibition does lie to prevent manifest injustice. Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P.2d 1006 (1957). A plaintiff who has sued out a writ of attachment upon personal property before judgment cannot secure an injunction with- out complying with this rule where there are no special requirements or procedure provided under statute by which an injunction or other relief shall be granted. Stull v. District Court, 135 Colo. 86, 308 P.2d 1006 (1957). If an injunction is void it can be collater- ally attacked. Resler v. North E. Motor Freight, Inc., 154 Colo. 52, 388 P.2d 255 (1964). A collateral attack on a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, contained in a motion for a new trial directed to contempt orders issued for disobedience of the restraining order or injunction, is proper only if the orders granting the temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction are void for some juris- dictional defect. Bd. of Water Works v. Pueblo Water Works Employees Local 1045, 196 Colo. 308, 586 P.2d 18 (1978). In a proper case where there will not be a double recovery, a court may issue an injunc- tion to open a blocked easement, and, if neces- sary to grant an injured party complete relief for past interference with his easement, the court may also award monetary damages. Proper v. Greager, 827 P.2d 591 (Colo. App. 1992). Applied in Ireland v. Wynkoop, 36 Colo. App. 206, 539 P.2d 1349 (1975); Sanderson v. District Court, 190 Colo. 431, 548 P.2d 921 (1976); Jeffrey v. Colo. State Dept. of Soc. Servs., 198 Colo. 265, 599 P.2d 874 (1979); Jack Kent Cadillac, Inc. v. District Court, 198 Colo. 403, 601 P.2d 626 (1979); In re Davis, 44 Colo. App. 355, 618 P.2d 692 (1980); State Pers. Bd. v. District Court, 637 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1981); Pasbrig v. Walton, 651 P.2d 459 (Colo. App. 1982); Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907 (Colo. App. 1997); People v. Wunder, 2016 COA 46, 371 P.3d 785. II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the ‘‘status quo’’ or protect rights pending the final determination of a cause. McLean v. Farmers’ Highline Canal & Reservoir Co., 44 Colo. 184, 98 P. 16 (1908) (decided under § 167 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was replaced by the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941). Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordi- nary remedy designed to protect a plaintiff from sustaining irreparable injury and to preserve the power of the district court to render a meaning- ful decision following a trial on the merits. Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1986). A preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo. Combined Communications Corp. v. City & County of Denver, 186 Colo. 443, 528 P.2d 249 (1974). The granting of a preliminary injunction pur- suant to section (a) of this rule is to preserve the status quo or otherwise to grant emergency re- lief. Macleod v. Miller, 44 Colo. App. 313, 612 P.2d 1158 (1980). The matter of a preliminary injunction is to prevent further harm where harm is alleged, or otherwise to grant emergency relief, and a hear- ing on the merits is contemplated at a later date. Graham v. Hoyl, 157 Colo. 338, 402 P.2d 604 (1965). A court errs and is precipitous in its action by making an injunction permanent where issues remain to be tried upon which parties are entitled to be heard before any orders could be made final. Graham v. Hoyl, 157 Colo. 338, 402 P.2d 604 (1965). Grant or denial of preliminary injunction not an adjudication of ultimate rights in con- troversy. The trial court erred when it deter- mined, on a motion for a preliminary injunc- tion, the title to the property at issue in the underlying transaction. Litinsky v. Querard, 683 P.2d 816 (Colo. App. 1984). Different considerations govern issues re- lating to preliminary injunctions and requests for permanent injunctions, with the standards applicable to permanent injunctions less de- manding. Henson v. Hoth, 258 F. Supp. 33 (D. Colo. 1966). A trial court has broad discretion to formu- late the terms of injunctive relief when equity so requires. Colo. Springs Bd. of Realtors v. State, 780 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1989). Decision within court’s discretion. The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is a decision which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); Litinsky v. Querard, 683 P.2d 816 (Colo. App. 1984); Zuments v. Colo. H.S. Activities Ass’n, 737 P.2d 1113 (Colo. App. 1987); Baseline Farms Two, LLP v. Hennings, 26 P.3d 1209 (Colo. App. 2000). Threshold requirement that relief neces- sary to protect rights. Before a trial court may enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute in a preliminary injunction proceeding, the moving party must establish, as a threshold requirement, a clear showing that injunctive relief is neces- sary to protect existing legitimate property rights or fundamental constitutional rights. Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982). As a prerequisite to the issuance of a pre- liminary injunction, there must be a showing of real, immediate, and irreparable injury which will occur pending a final hearing, and that the injunction is necessary to prevent such injury or damage. Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Green Shield Plan, Inc., 145 Colo. 188, 358 P.2d 473 (1960). The prerequisites to the issuance of a prelimi- nary injunction are: A showing of real, immedi- ate and irreparable injury which will occur pending a final hearing, and that the injunction is necessary to prevent such injury or damage; and a showing of the reasonable probability of success on the merits on the part of the plaintiff. Macleod v. Miller, 44 Colo. App. 313, 612 P.2d 1158 (1980). In exercising its discretion, the trial court must find that the moving party has demon- strated: (1) A reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury which may be prevented by injunctive relief; (3) that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; (4) that the granting of a preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest; (5) that the balance of equities favors the injunction; and (6) that the injunction will preserve the status quo pend- ing a trial on the merits. Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982); Wakabayashi v. Tooley, 648 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1982); Am. Televi- sion & Communications Corp. v. Manning, 651 P.2d 440 (Colo. App. 1982); Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cent. Mortg. & Inv., 708 P.2d 480 (Colo. App. 1985); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004); Gitlitz v. Bellock, 171 P.3d 1274 (Colo. App. 2007). Each prerequisite must be established by the moving party before a preliminary injunc- tion will issue to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute. Wakabayashi v. Tooley, 648 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1982). A loss of a contractual right to manage and control a business may constitute irreparable harm. Monetary damages are an inadequate remedy for such a loss. A contractual right to participate in the management and control of a business has intrinsic value in and of itself that may not be adequately compensated by mon- etary damages. Gitlitz v. Bellock, 171 P.3d 1274 (Colo. App. 2007). One of the issues before a court on a pre- liminary injunction is the reasonable prob- ability of success on the part of the plaintiff. Combined Communications Corp. v. City & County of Denver, 186 Colo. 443, 528 P.2d 249 (1974). Where a trial court issues a preliminary in- junction without making any findings of fact as to the likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits, the order must be set aside and the matter remanded for a hearing. O’Connell v. Colo. State Bank, 633 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1981). Decision to issue preliminary injunction is binding upon review. Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, trial court’s decision to is- sue a preliminary injunction is binding upon review. Macleod v. Miller, 44 Colo. App. 313, 612 P.2d 1158 (1980). Telephone company is not entitled to pre- liminary injunction preventing maintenance of rates and allowing higher charges during judicial review of P.U.C. rates. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. P. U. C., 176 Colo. 457, 491 P.2d 582 (1971). Relief seldom granted to enjoin govern- mental actions. Because equitable relief in the nature of an injunction constitutes a form of judicial interference with continuing activities, the courts have generally been reluctant to grant such relief where the actions complained of are those of departments of the executive and leg- islative branches of government, in the exercise of their authority. Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982). Preliminary injunction enjoining enforce- ment of criminal statute held abuse of discre- tion. Wakabayashi v. Tooley, 648 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1982). Preliminary injunction should not be en- forced when a period of less than two months remains after enforcement commences until trial on the merits. Combined Communications Corp. v. City & County of Denver, 186 Colo. 443, 528 P.2d 249 (1974). When order deemed preliminary injunc- tion. Where an order is issued after notice and an evidentiary hearing and for a period beyond 10 days, it is a preliminary injunction. O’Connell v. Colo. State Bank, 633 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1981). Effect of denial of preliminary injunction on remaining proceedings. The pending ap- peal of a denial of a motion for preliminary injunction does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed in a timely and orderly fashion with the declaratory judgment and per- manent injunction proceedings. Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982). Existence of liquidated damages does not automatically preclude imposition of an in- junction. Boulder Medical Center v. Moore, 651 P.2d 464 (Colo. App. 1982). Conditions of this rule inapplicable to C.R.C.P. 106. While this rule provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon giving security by the appli- cant, that no order or injunction shall issue without notice, except under certain situations, and that an early hearing shall be provided, no such conditions appear in C.R.C.P. 106. PII of Colo., Inc. v. District Court, 197 Colo. 239, 591 P.2d 1316 (1979). Contempt is proper where preliminary in- junction is lawful and is not complied with, even where eventually found to be wrongfully entered. Charles Milne Associates v. Toponce, 770 P.2d 1313 (Colo. App. 1988). The prerequisites of this rule apply to § 7- 74-103 actions for preliminary injunction to prevent or restrain actual or threatened misap- propriations of a trade secret. Bishop & Co. v. Cuomo, 799 P.2d 444 (Colo. App. 1990). Consolidation of trial and preliminary in- junction. Parties should normally receive no- tice of the court’s intent to consolidate the trial and the preliminary injunction either before the hearing or when the parties will still have an opportunity to present their cases. Taxpayers were not denied due process and if any error occurred, it was harmless, when the trial court announced it would consolidate the injunction hearing with the trial on the merits after com- mencement of the preliminary injunction hear- ing, both parties submitted offers of proof and had a full opportunity to present their cases, and no specific harm was alleged. Leek v. City of Golden, 870 P.2d 580 (Colo. App. 1993). III. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. Law reviews. For article, ‘‘In the Matter of Ex Parte Restraining Orders, Injunctions and Writs of Ne Exeat in Divorce Cases’’, see 9 Dicta 190 (1932). For article, ‘‘Expediting Court Procedure’’, see 10 Dicta 113 (1933). For article on restraining orders and injunctions without notice to defendant in divorce cases, see 20 Dicta 46 (1943). This rule relates to the issuance of re- straining orders without notice to the person to be restrained, and adequate protections are afforded in the matter of a bond and prompt hearing on the question of whether the ‘‘ex parte’’ order should be continued. Simpson v. Simpson, 151 Colo. 88, 376 P.2d 55 (1962). A court has no authority to grant a re- straining order to prevent an administrative board from holding hearings as scheduled by it. Such court action is a direct and unjustified judicial interference with a function properly delegated to the executive branch of govern- ment. Banking Bd. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 77, 492 P.2d 837 (1972). A restraining order which fails to comply with this rule is void. Renner v. Williams, 140 Colo. 432, 344 P.2d 966 (1959); Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n v. District Court, 160 Colo. 128, 414 P.2d 911 (1966). Where a restraining order is completely de- void of virtually all of the requirements of this rule, any one of the deficiencies is sufficient to render the order a nullity. Renner v. Williams, 140 Colo. 432, 344 P.2d 966 (1959). Requirements under sections (b) and (d) of this rule are mandatory and must be complied with before a temporary restraining order issued without notice is valid. Mile High Kennel Club v. Colo. Greyhound Breeders Ass’n, 38 Colo. App. 519, 559 P.2d 1120 (1977). Hearing required for determination that order wrongfully issued. Absent a hearing on the merits, no determination can be made that a temporary restraining order has been wrong- fully issued. Cross v. Bd. of Dirs. of Plains Coop. Tel. Ass’n, 39 Colo. App. 569, 570 P.2d 1307 (1977). Only after the enjoined party has been vindi- cated by successfully defending against the suit on the merits can it be held that he was wrong- fully restrained and entitled to damages. Cross v. Bd. of Dirs. of Plains Coop. Tel. Ass’n, 39 Colo. App. 569, 570 P.2d 1307 (1977). Orders held deficient. Orders merely stating that the defendants were engaged in a boycott, and concluding that the plaintiffs would be ir- reparably damaged if the boycott was not re- strained, do not specifically define the injury and do not state why the injury is irreparable. Either one of these deficiencies is sufficient to render the orders a nullity. Mile High Kennel Club v. Colo. Greyhound Breeders Ass’n, 38 Colo. App. 519, 559 P.2d 1120 (1977). In a contempt proceeding, it is proper as a defense to raise the validity of a restraining order. Renner v. Williams, 140 Colo. 432, 344 P.2d 966 (1959). Upon hearing on a citation for contempt for violation of a temporary restraining order where the issues have not been joined in the action and only the validity of a temporary order has been challenged, it is error for a trial court to rule on the issue of a permanent injunction. Renner v. Williams, 140 Colo. 432, 344 P.2d 966 (1959). A temporary restraining order issued un- der this rule is not an appealable order under C.A.R. 1(a). Freshpict Foods, Inc. v. Campos, 30 Colo. App. 354, 492 P.2d 867 (1971); O’Connell v. Colo. State Bank, 633 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1981). Rationale behind nonappealability of tempo- rary restraining orders is that they are of short duration and terminate with the ruling of the preliminary injunction so that an immediate ap- peal is not necessary to protect the rights of the parties. O’Connell v. Colo. State Bank, 633 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1981). IV. SECURITY. Law reviews. For article, ‘‘In the Matter of Ex Parte Restraining Orders, Injunctions and Writs of Ne Exeat in Divorce Cases’’, see 9 Dicta 190 (1932). For article, ‘‘Expediting Court Procedure’’, see 10 Dicta 113 (1933). Action on bond where injunction suit dis- missed at instance of plaintiff. In an action on the bond to secure a temporary injunction, the fact that the injunction, suit is dismissed at the instance of the plaintiff is not to be taken as an admission that an emergency requiring the issu- ance of an injunction did not exist, if the dis- missal is for matters done or arising subsequent to the issuance of the injunction and the original issuance was proper. Hammaker v. Behm, 116 Colo. 523, 182 P.2d 141 (1947). An injunction was issued without compli- ance with this rule where trial court deter- mined that it would not require defendants to post any bond or other security and made no mention of potential costs and losses that might be sustained by plaintiff. Apache Village, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 776 P.2d 1154 (Colo. App. 1989). The amount of security required by this rule is discretionary with the court so long as it bears a reasonable relationship to the poten- tial costs and losses occasioned by a prelimi- nary injunction which is later determined to have been improperly granted. Apache Village, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 776 P.2d 1154 (Colo. App. 1989). Injunction, including TRO, not void or in- valid for failure to post a bond, unless the court’s order provides otherwise and injunction remains in effect until vacated by subsequent order or terminates by own terms. Kaiser v. Market Square Discount Liquors, Inc., 992 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1999). Bond was properly ordered paid to defen- dant to reimburse the costs of an improvi- dently issued injunction even when the plain- tiff’s failure to prevail was based solely on a question of law. Wick v. Pueblo West Metro., 789 P.2d 457 (Colo. App. 1989). Section (c) of this rule imposes two condi- tions on an enjoined defendant seeking to recover damages on a bond: First, the injunc- tion must have been ‘‘wrongful’’, and second, the defendant must have suffered damages as a result of the issuance of the injunction. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992); Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 948 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1997). The judicial discretion standard, under which the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to award damages on the bond, is the most consistent with the plain language of sec- tion (c) of this rule. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Section (c) of this rule requires that an applicant give a bond, but it does not ex- pressly order the court to pay that bond to a prevailing defendant. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Under the good reason rule principle of preference, which limits the judicial discre- tion standard, a trial court presumes that a prevailing defendant is entitled to damages on the injunction bond, unless there is good reason for not requiring such payment in the particular case. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992); Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 948 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1997). When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination of good reason, the standard of review regarding which factors the trial court has used is akin to review by the standard of simple error used in reviewing de- cisions of questions of law. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court considered and balanced ap- propriate factors in determining that good reason existed to deny damages, where it con- sidered the outcome of the underlying suit, the fact that the claims were brought in good faith, the financial status of the parties, and the fact that the action was brought solely in the public interest. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). V. FORM AND SCOPE. An injunction must be specific to be valid. Resler v. North E. Motor Freight, Inc., 154 Colo. 52, 388 P.2d 255 (1964). Injunctions may be issued without being reviewed ‘‘as to form only’’ by counsel. Such notice is not required under C.R.C.P. 6 since that rule concerns notice of written motions as to enlargements of time and has no relevance to the issue of injunctions. Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People ex rel. Swisher, 166 Colo. 199, 444 P.2d 277 (1968). An injunction prohibiting conduct must be sufficiently precise to enable the party subject to the equitable decree to conform its conduct to the requirements thereof. Colo. Springs Bd. of Realtors v. State, 780 P.2d 494 (Colo. 1989). There is no requirement in this rule that an injunction must be included in a written judgment granting injunctive relief, as this rule contains no requirements with respect to judg- ments; it merely sets forth what must be con- tained in an injunction which followed the judg- ment at a later date. Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People ex rel. Swisher, 166 Colo. 199, 444 P.2d 277 (1968). Inconsistencies between this rule and § 25-7-102 resolved in section’s favor. Where the proceeding is a special statutory proceeding under the air pollution control act, any inconsis- tency between this rule and § 25-7-102 regard- ing the form and scope of an injunction is re- solved in favor of the statutory section. Fry Roofing Co. v. Dept. of Health, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976). If the statute does not create a special statutory procedure for obtaining a prelimi- nary injunction, the normal requisites of this rule apply. Because neither § 25-8-611 nor § 25-8-612 authorizes injunctions or creates a private cause of action or right to proceed in the public interest, this rule, including the require- ment of a showing of real, immediate, and ir- reparable injury, applies to a suit to seek a preliminary injunction to enforce Colorado’s Water Quality Control Act. Baseline Farms Two, LLP v. Hennings, 26 P.3d 1209 (Colo. App. 2000). Specific oral pronouncement followed by minute order was sufficient to satisfy rule that injunctions be specific in terms and described in detail. Charles Milne Associates v. Toponce, 770 P.2d 1313 (Colo. App. 1988). Applied in Carbajal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2020 COA 49, 467 P.3d 1262. VI. MANDATORY DECREE. This section is a correct statement of the general law, and provides for restoration of property where proper. This section affords a complete answer to the problem of whether property obtained by force and violence, and perhaps by fraud, which prior thereto had been used by plaintiffs in the conduct of a legitimate business, may, in the administration of equitable relief, be restored to plaintiffs. Cuddigan v. San Juan Fed’n of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, 110 Colo. 97, 130 P.2d 923 (1942). In an action founded on a complaint for injunction and affirmative relief wherein it is alleged that the plaintiffs were ousted by the defendants by force and violence from the pos- session of property and its possession ever since withheld from them by threats of violence, a decree ordering restitution of the property to the plaintiffs is a final judgment from which an appeal will lie. Sprague v. Locke, 1 Colo. App. 171, 28 P. 142 (1891). Plaintiff seeking injunctive relief is obli- gated to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo pending trial, because, if the defen- dant completes the act sought to be restrained pending trial, the plaintiff’s action becomes moot and should properly be dismissed. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1986). Injunction not available under § 30-28- 110 (4). Although section (f) provides for the issuance of a mandatory injunction, the strict construction of § 30-28-110 (4) precludes the availability of such relief to a county. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Pfeifer, 190 Colo. 275, 546 P.2d 946 (1976). Denial of mandatory injunction held cor- rect. Eugene Cervi & Co. v. Russell, 31 Colo. App. 525, 506 P.2d 748 (1972), aff’d, 184 Colo. 282, 519 P.2d 1189 (1974). VII. WHEN RELIEF GRANTED. Section (g) clearly contemplates that an injunction may be provided for in a separate document, rather than in a judgment. Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People ex rel. Swisher, 166 Colo. 199, 444 P.2d 277 (1968). Probate court had authority under section (h) to enter no-contact order between father and children after a full hearing on motions related to parenting time and child support. People ex rel. A.R.D., 43 P.3d 632 (Colo. App. 2001). VIII. WHEN INAPPLICABLE. This rule does not apply to suits for di- vorce. Where, in a divorce action, a temporary restraining order was issued against the husband preventing him from disposing of his property, ‘‘pending the further order of the court’’, such order is not controlled by the provisions of this rule which specifically provide in section (h) that this rule shall not apply to suits for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance or custody of infants. Gillespie v. District Court, 119 Colo. 242, 202 P.2d 151 (1949). Rule not applicable to divorce actions ex- cept in circumstances of actual emergency. Under this rule, restraining orders should not be issued in divorce actions except in circum- stances of actual emergency and where it is clearly established that grounds exist for grant- ing such extraordinary remedy. Simpson v. Simpson, 151 Colo. 88, 376 P.2d 55 (1962). Only under extraordinary circumstances should third persons not involved in the marital difficulties of the parties to a divorce action, who are carrying on legitimate business trans- actions with one of the parties thereto, be re- strained or enjoined from continuing business activities with such persons, even upon notice. Simpson v. Simpson, 151 Colo. 88, 376 P.2d 55 (1962). Discretion rests with trial court to enter a restraining order without notice or bond, as may be just. Simpson v. Simpson, 151 Colo. 88, 376 P.2d 55 (1962). In the judicial enforcement proceeding un- der the Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act, the normally applicable irreparable injury and posting of security requirements under the rule do not apply. The usually applicable discretion to postpone the effective date of agency action under the State Administrative Procedure Act, which the court may issue upon a finding of irreparable injury pending judicial review, does not apply to the statute. Kourlis v. District Court, El Paso County, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1997). Applied in Wolfberg v. Noland, 122 Colo. 338, 222 P.2d 426 (1950); Mann v. Friden, 132 Colo. 273, 287 P.2d 961 (1955).