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C.R.C.P. 242.27

Failure to Answer and Default

activein force · 2021-07-01 – presentact-effective-date

(a) Motion for and Entry of Default. If a respondent does not timely file an answer, the

Regulation Counsel will move for entry of default. For good cause shown, the Presiding

Disciplinary Judge may grant the respondent leave to file an untimely answer. If the

Presiding Disciplinary Judge enters default, the properly pleaded allegations and claims in

the complaint will be deemed admitted.

(b) Sanctions Hearing. After default is entered, a sanctions hearing will be held under

C.R.C.P. 242.30 to determine the appropriate sanction. If, 14 days after entry of default,

neither the respondent nor the Regulation Counsel has requested a sanctions hearing before

a Hearing Board, then the sanctions hearing will be held solely before the Presiding

Disciplinary Judge. At the sanctions hearing, the respondent may appear and present

evidence and arguments about the appropriate sanction.

(c) Notice. The respondent and the complaining witness must be given at least 28

days’ notice of the sanctions hearing in accordance with C.R.C.P. 242.29(b).

(d) Opinion. After the sanctions hearing, an opinion will be issued under C.R.C.P.

242.31.

History

Source: Entire rule added and adopted May 20, 2021, effective for cases filed with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge or the Supreme Court on or after July 1, 2021, and, as to all other matters covered by these rules, effective July 1, 2021. ANNOTATION Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this rule. Both the charges and the well-pleaded facts are deemed admitted by the entry of a default judgment. People v. Richards, 748 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1987); People v. Y oung, 201 P.3d 1273 (Colo. O.P .D.J. 2008). The allegations of fact were deemed admit- ted where attorney did not answer the com- plaint filed in the case and the hearing board entered a default against him. People v. Davies, 926 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1996); In re Demaray, 8 P.3d 427 (Colo. 1999). A motion to set aside a default because the respondent failed to file a timely answer un- der this rule can be analogized to a motion under C.R.C.P. 60 (b)(1). The decision to grant relief is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). In a motion to set aside a default judg- ment, the movant bears the burden of prov- ing the grounds for relief by clear, strong, and satisfactory proof. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). Because an attorney has a duty to cooper- ate with disciplinary proceedings, default judgments are not subject to being set aside easily. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). In setting aside a default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect, the court must determine: Whether the neglect causing the default was excusable; whether the movant has alleged a meritorious defense; and whether re- lief from the order would be equitable. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). Failure to act because of carelessness and negligence is not excusable neglect. In re Weisbard, 25 P.3d 24 (Colo. 2001). Applied in People v. Moore, 681 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1984); People v. Stauffer, 745 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1987); People v. Jacobson, 747 P.2d 654 (Colo. 1987); People v. Dohe, 800 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1990); People v. Ashley, 817 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1991); People v. Rouse, 817 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1991); People v. Barr, 855 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1993); In the Matter of Scott, 979 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1999).

Provenance

Source
content.leg.colorado.gov
Retrieved
2026-09-15
Edition
2026-09-15
Content hash
3dbb8438b687e1a38b0fdd30c02b2d7ab409adf60ad61409715619eccc75e9c5
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C.R.C.P. 242.27 — Failure to Answer and Default · binding.law