CO · rules
C.R.C.P. 22
Interpleader
(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to
double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of
the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not have a common
origin or are not identical but are adverse to and independent of one another, or that the
plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A
defendant exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross claim
or counterclaim. The provisions of this Rule supplement and do not in any way limit the
joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.
(2) In any civil action of interpleader, a district court may enter its order restraining all
claimants from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any court of this state affecting
the property, instrument, or obligation involved in the interpleader action until further order
of the court.
Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the plaintiff
from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to
enforce its judgment.
History
Cross references: For joinder of additional parties pursuant to counterclaims or cross claims, see C.R.C.P. 13(h); for proper venue, see C.R.C.P. 98. ANNOTATION Law reviews. For article, ‘‘Pleadings, Rules 7 to 25’’, see 28 Dicta 368 (1951). Rule must be given liberal construction. In determining the right of one to intervene in an action, the liberal construction of the rules of civil procedure called for in C.R.C.P. 1 must be followed. Senne v. Conley, 110 Colo. 270, 133 P.2d 381 (1943). Trial court’s order not subject to collateral attack in interpleader action. McLeod v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Colo. 234, 526 P.2d 1318 (1974). Amended pleading asserting an interpleader claim is not futile if it alleges facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that exposure to double or multiple liability may exist. Certainty of exposure to double or multiple liability is not the test; rather, the alle- gations must meet a minimum threshold of sub- stantiality. Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81 (Colo. 2002). For earlier cases affording a limited sort of interpleader, see Fischer v. Hanna, 8 Colo. App. 471, 47 P. 303 (1896); Price v. Lucky Four Gold Mining Co., 56 Colo. 163, 136 P. 1021 (1913); Engineer’s Constr. Corp. v. Tolbert, 74 Colo. 542, 223 P. 56 (1924) (decided under § 18 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was replaced by the Rules of Civil Pro- cedure in 1941). Applied in Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. Colo. Springs Teachers Ass’n, 41 Colo. App. 267, 583 P.2d 952 (1978); M & G Engines v. Mroch, 631 P.2d 1177 (Colo. App. 1981); West Greeley Nat’l Bank v. Wygant, 650 P.2d 1339 (Colo. App. 1982).
Provenance
- Source
- content.leg.colorado.gov
- Retrieved
- 2026-09-15
- Edition
- 2026-09-15
- Content hash
da9ee18b5ce8fc4a7350009e7743b6c2a795cc444c453fe41b1146eeed61a0a3
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