C.R.C.P. 121

History

COMMITTEE COMMENT The purpose of section 1-1(5) is to imple- ment Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b) and 311(b), which authorize limited representa- tion of a pro se party either on a pro bono or fee basis, in accordance with Colorado Rule of Pro- fessional Conduct 1.2. This provision provides assurance that an attorney who makes a limited appearance for a pro se party in a specified case proceeding(s), at the request of and with the consent of the pro se party, can withdraw from the case upon filing a notice of completion of the limited appearance, without leave of court. Source: Committee comment amended and adopted June 17, 1999, effective July 1, 1999; entire section and committee comment repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 2.(b) amended and effective January 7, 2010; 5. added and effective October 20, 2011; IP 2.(b), 2.(b)(IV), 2.(c), and 3. amended and adopted Decem- ber 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b). COMMITTEE COMMENT An ‘‘active case’’ is any case other than a ‘‘completed case’’ as described in subsection 3 of the Practice Standard. Source: Entire section amended and adopted and committee comment repealed October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; amended and effective September 9, 2015. Source: Entire section repealed and reenacted July 12, 1990, effective September 1, 1990. COMMITTEE COMMENT Amendment of this practice standard is to conform it to the requirements of C.R.S. 13-71- 144 (1989) and amended C.R.C.P 38. Under that statutory requirement, each party who wishes to be assured of having a jury trial, must demand a jury trial and pay a jury fee within the time specified. The case will be tried to a jury if the party demanding a jury trial makes a timely demand, pays the jury fee at the time of the demand and does not later waive a jury trial. If a demand is timely made and the jury fee timely paid, the right to jury trial cannot be withdrawn as against a party who has demanded a jury trial and timely paid a jury fee. For a party to be certain of having a jury trial, that party must demand it and timely pay a jury fee. SUPPRESSION FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS In any civil action, upon written request of the claiming party, the fact of the filing of a case shall be suppressed by the clerk only upon order of the court to secure service of summons or other process and such order shall expire upon service of such summons or other process. COMMITTEE COMMENT This Practice Standard was a local rule found in most districts. It provides the machinery for the clerk to temporarily suppress the fact of filing of a case temporarily to avoid publicity that may affect ability to serve process. Such temporary suppression in aid of service of pro- cess, is different from the Practice Standard pertaining to limitation of access to court files. COMMITTEE COMMENT This Practice Standard was made necessary by lack of uniformity throughout the districts concerning access to court files. Some districts permitted free access after service of process was obtained. Others, particularly in malprac- tice or domestic relations cases, almost rou- tinely prohibited access to court file informa- tion. The committee deemed it preferable to have machinery available for limitation in an appropriate case, but also a means for other entities having interest in the litigation, includ- ing the media, to have access. COMMITTEE COMMENT The change in Standard 1-6 is to allow for settings on initiative of the Court. This change is to resolve the question raised by several dis- tricts as to whether the Court had the power to initiate its own settings. There has also been a slight tidying-up of language of the first sentence. COMMITTEE COMMENT This Practice Standard was deemed neces- sary because it was apparent from local rules of a number of counties that there was a general lack of awareness of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct pertaining to photographing, broadcasting, televising or recording court pro- ceedings. This Practice Standard draws atten- tion to Canon 3 and incorporates its provisions by reference. Source: Entire section amended and adopted January 7, 2021, effective April 1, 2021. Source: Entire section amended and committee comment added, adopted January 7, 2021, effective April 1, 2021. COMMITTEE COMMENT The purpose of this Practice Standard is to afford notice of related state or federal cases that are pending or were recently terminated. Any actions to be taken following such notice are left to the parties and the court. Source: 2. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b). COMMITTEE COMMENT The purpose of this Practice Standard is to encourage prosecution of pending cases and permit machinery to dispose of matters which are not being prosecuted. Dismissal is without prejudice, and there are sufficient safeguards incorporated into the Practice Standard to per- mit retention on the docket if cause for the delay and interest in the case is shown. The Practice Standard does not mandate that the court search its files and send out notices, but permits such action if the court wishes. The Practice Standard also permits initiation of the procedure by motion. Source: Entire section amended and adopted April 14, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, for all cases filed on or after that date. MATTERS RELATED TO DISCOVERY 1. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, reasonable notice for the taking of deposi- tions pursuant to C.R.C.P. 30(b)(1) shall not be less than 7 days. Before serving a notice to take a deposition, counsel seeking the deposition shall make a good faith effort to schedule it by agreement at a time reasonably convenient and economically efficient to the proposed deponent and counsel for all parties. Prior to scheduling or noticing any deposition, all counsel shall confer in a good faith effort to agree on a reasonable means of limiting the time and expense of that deposition. Pending resolution of any motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(c), the filing of the motion shall stay the discovery at which the motion is directed. If the court directs that any discovery motion under Rule 26(c) be made orally, then movant’s written notice to the other parties that a hearing has been requested on the motion shall stay the discovery to which the motion is directed. 2. Motions under Rules 26(c) and 37(a), C.R.C.P., shall set forth the interrogatory, request, question or response constituting the subject matter of the motion. 3. Interrogatories and requests under Rules 33, 34, and 36, C.R.C.P., and the responses thereto shall be served upon other counsel or parties, but shall not be filed with the court. If relief is sought under Rule 26(c), C.R.C.P., or Rule 37(a), C.R.C.P., copies of the portions of the interrogatories, requests, answers or responses in dispute shall be filed with the court contemporaneously with the motion. If interrogatories, requests, answers or responses are to be used at trial, the portions to be used shall be made available and placed, but not filed, with the trial judge at the outset of the trial insofar as their use reasonably can be anticipated. 4. The originals of all stenographically reported depositions shall be delivered to the party taking the deposition after submission to the deponent as required by Rule 30(e), C.R.C.P. The original of the deposition shall be retained by the party to whom it is delivered to be available for appropriate use by any party in a hearing or trial of the case. If a deposition is to be used at trial, it shall be made available for inspection and placed, but not filed with the trial judge at the outset of the trial insofar as its use reasonably can be anticipated. 5. Unless otherwise ordered, the court will not entertain any motion under Rule 37(a), C.R.C.P., unless counsel for the moving party has conferred or made reasonable effort to confer with opposing counsel concerning the matter in dispute before the filing of the motion. Counsel for the moving party shall file a certificate of compliance with this rule at the time the motion under Rule 37(a), C.R.C.P., is filed. If the court requires that any discovery motion be made orally, then movant must make a reasonable effort to confer with opposing counsel before requesting a hearing from the court. Source: 1. amended April 14, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, for all cases filed on or after that date; committee comment approved June 10, 1994; committee comment cor- rected and effective January 9, 1995; 1. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b); 1., 5., and comments amended and adopted January 29, 2016, effective for motions filed on or after April 1, 2016. COMMENTS [1] Provisions of the practice standard are patterned in part after the local rule now in effect in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. This practice standard specifies the minimum time for the serving of a notice to take deposition. Before serving a no- tice, however, counsel are required to make a good faith effort to schedule the deposition by agreement at a time reasonably convenient and economically efficient to the deponent and all counsel. Counsel are also required to confer in a good faith effort to agree on a reasonable means of limiting the time and expense of any deposi- tion. The provisions of this Practice Standard are also designed to lessen paper mass/filing space problems and resolve various general problems related to discovery. [2] This rule was amended to address situ- ations arising in courts that require oral discov- ery motions. Source: Entire section amended and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006. COMMITTEE COMMENT This Practice Standard sets forth detailed pro- cedural safeguards for taking of depositions by tape recording as set out in Sanchez v. District Court, 200 Colo. 33, 624 P.2d 1314 (1981). Source: 1., 3., and committee comment amended and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 3. and comment amended and effective January 12, 2017; 1.(f) amended and effective August 17, 2020. COMMENT This Practice Standard was needed because neither C.R.C.P. 55, nor any local rule specified the elements necessary to obtain a default judg- ment and each court was left to determine what was necessary. One faced with the task of at- tempting to obtain a default judgment usually found themselves making several trips to the courthouse, numerous phone calls and redoing needed documents several times. The Practice Standard is designed to minimize both court and attorney time. The Practice Standard sets forth a standardized check list which designates particular items needed for obtaining a default judgment. For guidance on affidavits, see C.R.C.P. 108. See also Section 13-63-101, C.R.S., concerning affidavits and requirements by the court. DETERMINATION OF MOTIONS 1. Motions and Briefs; When Required; Time for Serving and Filing — Length. (a) Except motions during trial or where the court orders that certain or all non-dispositive motions be made orally, any motions involving a contested issue of law shall be supported by a recitation of legal authority incorporated into the motion, which shall not be filed with a separate brief. Unless the court orders otherwise, motions and responsive briefs not under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) or (2), or 56 are limited to 15 pages, and reply briefs to 10 pages, not including the case caption, signature block, certificate of service and attachments. Unless the court orders other- wise, motions and responsive briefs under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) or (2) or 56 are limited to 25 pages, and reply briefs to 15 pages, not including the case caption, signature block, certificate of service and attachments. All motions and briefs shall comply with C.R.C.P. 10(d). (b) The responding party shall have 21 days after the filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may allow in which to file a responsive brief. If a motion is filed 42 days or less before the trial date, the responding party shall have 14 days after the filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may allow in which to file a responsive brief. (c) Except for a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56, the moving party shall have 7 days after the filing of the responsive brief or such greater or lesser time as the court may allow to file a reply brief. For a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56, the moving party shall have 14 days after the filing of the responsive brief or such greater or lesser time as the court may allow to file a reply brief. (d) A motion shall not be included in a response or reply to the original motion. 2. Affidavits. If facts not appearing of record may be considered in disposition of the motion, the parties may file affidavits with the motion or within the time specified for filing the party’s brief in this section 1-15, Rules 6, 56 or 59, C.R.C.P., or as otherwise ordered by the court. Copies of such affidavits and any documentary evidence used in connection with the motion shall be served on all other parties. 3. Effect of Failure to File Legal Authority. If the moving party fails to incorporate legal authority into a written motion, the court may deem the motion abandoned and may enter an order denying the motion. Other than motions seeking to resolve a claim or defense under C.R.C.P. 12 or 56, failure of a responding party to file a responsive brief may be considered a confession of the motion. 4. Motions to Be Determined on Briefs, When Oral Argument Is Allowed; Mo- tions Requiring Immediate Attention. Motions shall be determined promptly if possible. The court has discretion to order briefing or set a hearing on the motion. If possible, the court shall determine oral motions at the conclusion of the argument, but may take the motion under advisement or require briefing before ruling. Any motion requiring immediate disposition shall be called to the attention of the courtroom clerk by the party filing such motion. 5. Notification of Court’s Ruling; Setting of Argument or Hearing When Or- dered. Whenever the court enters an order denying or granting a motion without a hearing, all parties shall be forthwith notified by the court of such order. If the court desires or authorizes oral argument or an evidentiary hearing, all parties shall be so notified by the court. After notification, it shall be the responsibility of the moving party to have the motion set for oral argument or hearing. Unless the court orders otherwise, a notice to set oral argument or hearing shall be filed in accordance with Practice Standard § 1-6 within 7 days of notification that oral argument or hearing is required or authorized. 6. Effect of Failure to Appear at Oral Argument or Hearing. If any of the parties fails to appear at an oral argument or hearing, without prior showing of good cause for non-appearance, the court may proceed to hear and rule on the motion. 7. Sanctions. If a frivolous motion is filed or if frivolous opposition to a motion is interposed, the court may assess reasonable attorney’s fees against the party or attorney filing such motion or interposing such opposition. 8. Duty to Confer. Unless a statute or rule governing the motion provides that it may be filed without notice, moving counsel and any self-represented party shall confer with opposing counsel and any self-represented parties before filing a motion. The requirement of self-represented parties to confer and the requirement to confer with self-represented parties shall not apply to any incarcerated person, or any self-represented party as to whom the requirement is contrary to court order or statute, including, but not limited to, any person as to whom contact would or precipitate a violation of a protection or restraining order. The motion shall, at the beginning, contain a certification that the movant in good faith has conferred with opposing counsel and any self-represented parties about the motion. If the relief sought by the motion has been agreed to by the parties or will not be opposed, the court shall be so advised in the motion. If no conference has occurred, the reason why, including all efforts to confer, shall be stated. 9. Unopposed Motions. All unopposed motions shall be so designated in the title of the motion. 10. Proposed Order. Except for orders containing signatures of the parties or attor- neys as required by statute or rule, each motion shall be accompanied by a proposed order submitted in editable format. The proposed order complies with this provision if it states that the requested relief be granted or denied. 11. Motions to Reconsider. Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders of the court, meaning motions to reconsider other than those governed by C.R.C.P. 59 or 60, are disfavored. A party moving to reconsider must show more than a disagreement with the court’s decision. Such a motion must allege a manifest error of fact or law that clearly mandates a different result or other circumstance resulting in manifest injustice. The motion shall be filed within 14 days from the date of the order, unless the party seeking reconsideration shows good cause for not filing within that time. Good cause for not filing within 14 days from the date of the order includes newly available material evidence and an intervening change in the governing legal standard. The court may deny the motion before receiving a responsive brief under paragraph 1(b) of this standard. Source: 1. amended and effective September 6, 1990; 1. and committee comment amended July 9, 1992, effective October 1, 1992; 1., 3., and 8. amended and adopted April 14, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, for all cases filed on or after that date; committee comment approved June 10, 1994; committee comment corrected May 14, 1996; 1. and 8. amended and adopted and 9. added and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 1. amended and effective June 28, 2007; 1. corrected and effective November 5, 2007; 8. and committee comment para. 2 amended and effective October 12, 2009; 1. and 5. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b); 10. added and effective February 29, 2012; 10. amended and effective June 7, 2013; 2. amended and effective December 31, 2013; 11. added and committee comment amended and effective September 18, 2014; 1., 3., 4., 5., and comments amended and adopted January 29, 2016, effective for motions filed on or after April 1, 2016; 1.(a), 3., and 8., amended December 7, 2017, effective January 1, 2018; 1.(a) amended and effective April 5, 2018. COMMENTS [1] This Practice Standard was necessary be- cause of lack of uniformity among the districts concerning how motions were to be made, set and determined. The Practice Standard recog- nizes that oral argument and hearings are not necessary in all cases, and encourages disposi- tion of motions upon written submissions. The standard also sets forth the uniform require- ments concerning filing of legal authority, filing of matters not already of record necessary to determination of motions, and the manner of setting an oral argument if argument is permit- ted. The practice standard is broad enough to include all motions, including venue motions. Some motions will not require extended legal analysis or affidavits. Obviously, if the basis for a motion is simple and routine, the citation of authorities can be correspondingly simple. Mo- tions or briefs in excess of 10 pages are discour- aged. [2] This standard specifies contemporaneous recitation of legal authority either in the motion itself for all motions except those under C.R.C.P. Rule 56. Moving counsel should con- fer with opposing counsel before filing a motion to attempt to work out the difference prompting the motion. Every motion must, at the begin- ning, contain a certification that the movant, in good faith, has conferred with opposing counsel about the motion. If there has been no confer- ence, the reason why must be stated. To assist the court, if the relief sought by the motion has been agreed to or will not be opposed, the court is to be so advised in the motion. [3] Paragraph 4 of the standard contains an important feature. Any matter requiring imme- diate action should be called to the attention of the courtroom clerk by the party filing a motion for forthwith disposition. Calling the urgency of a matter to the attention of the court is a respon- sibility of the parties. The court should permit a forthwith determination. [4] Paragraph 11 of the standard neither lim- its a trial court’s discretion to modify an inter- locutory order, on motion or sua sponte, nor affects C.R.M. 5(a). [5] The sentence in the 1994 comment that ‘‘motions or briefs in excess of 10 pages are discouraged’’ has been superseded by the 2015 amendments to the rule on the length of mo- tions and briefs. The sentence in the 1994 com- ment that ‘‘moving counsel should confer with opposing counsel before filing a motion to at- tempt to work out the difference prompting the motion’’ is corrected to change the word ‘‘should’’ to ‘‘shall’’ to be consistent with the wording of the rule. Source: Entire section repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 1. and 2. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b). Source: Entire section amended and adopted September 30, 2004, effective for Domes- tic Relations Cases as defined in 16.2(a) filed on or after January 1, 2005, and for post-decree motions filed on or after January 1, 2005. COMMITTEE COMMENT This standard draws attention to the require- ments of C.R.C.P. 10(d) pertaining to paper size, paper quality, format and spacing of court documents. Color of paper and print require- ments for documents not filed by E-Filing or facsimile copy were made necessary because colors other than black and white create photo- copying and microfilming difficulties. Provision is also made to clarify that forms reproduced by word processor are acceptable if they follow the format of the form and state the effective date of the form which it reproduces. Source: 1. and 3. amended and adopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006. COMMITTEE COMMENT This Practice Standard sets forth uniform re- quirements for obtaining, paying for, certifica- tion and removal of court reporter transcripts. Source: Amended and committee comment added, July 9, 1992, effective October 1, 1992; 1. and 2.(b) amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b); 1. and comments amended and adopted May 28, 2015, effective July 1, 2015, for cases filed on or after July 1, 2015. COMMENTS [1] Costs. This Standard establishes a uniform, optimum time within which to claim costs. The 15 day requirement encourages prompt filings so that disputes on costs can be determined with other post-trial motions. This Standard also requires itemization and totaling of cost items and reminds practitioners of the means of determining disputes on costs. C.R.S. 13-16-122 (1981) sets forth those items gener- ally awardable as costs. [2] Attorney Fees. Subject to certain ex- ceptions, this Standard establishes a uniform procedure for resolving attorney fee disputes in matters where the request for attorney fees is made at the conclusion of an action or where attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party (see ‘‘Scope’’). Unless otherwise ordered by the court, attorney fees under C.R.S. 14-10- 119 should be heard at the time of the hearing on the motion or proceeding for which they are requested. [3] The prior version of Rule 121, Section 1-22(2) addressed when and under what cir- cumstances a party is entitled to a hearing re- garding an award of attorney fees, but no rule addressed the circumstances regarding a hear- ing on costs. The procedural mechanisms re- garding awards of attorney fees and awards of costs should be the same, and thus the rule change adds the existing language regarding hearings on attorney fees to awards of costs. Source: Entire section and committee comment repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 6. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b); 7. added and comments amended, effective January 12, 2017; 8. and 9. added and adopted, effective March 5, 2020. COMMENTS [1] The Committee is aware that issues have arisen regarding the effective date of a bond, and thus the effectiveness of injunction orders and other orders which are conditioned upon the filing of an acceptable bond. Certain types of bonds are almost always acceptable and thus, under this rule, are automatically effective upon filing with the Court subject to the consider- ation of timely filed objections. Other types of bonds may or may not be acceptable and should not be effective until the Court determines the sufficiency of the bond. The court may permit property bonds upon such conditions as are ap- propriate to protect the judgment creditor (or other party sought to be protected). Such condi- tions may include an appraisal by a qualified appraiser, information regarding liens and en- cumbrances against the property, and title insur- ance. [2] This rule also sets the presumptive amount of a supersedeas bond for a money judgment. The amount of a supersedeas bond for a non-money judgment must be determined in the particular case by the court and this rule is not intended to affect the court’s discretion to deny a supersedeas bond in the case of a non- money judgment. Source: Entire section repealed and reserved effective March 5, 2020. Source: Entire section and committee comment added and effective September 6, 1990. COMMITTEE COMMENT Facsimile transmissions are becoming com- monplace in the business world. It was there- fore deemed reasonable that the court system adapt to accommodate the use of this technol- ogy. Use of the technology, however, should not create more work for court staff. In order not to add to the duties of overburdened court person- nel, provision is made that court personnel need not provide confirmation that a facsimile trans- mission has been received. This should not cre- ate difficulty for attorneys because almost all equipment manufactured today provides confir- mation that a document has been received. This confirmation should be attached to the docu- ment sent and retained with the original docu- ment in the party’s file. The committee envisioned at least two ways in which facsimile filings could be accom- plished. The first would be an arrangement where the facsimile machine would be located in a court clerk’s office. The other would be where transmissions would be made to a ma- chine outside the courthouse and then delivered to the clerk for filing. These rules were designed to accommodate both kinds of filings. Ordinary thermofax paper fades in sunlight, deteriorates with handling and has a short shelf life. Therefore, only permanent plain paper which is not subject to these infirmities is ac- ceptable for court purposes. The committee also recognized that a re- quirement for filing of the original after filing of a facsimile copy would create more work for court staff. The committee therefore decided to accept facsimile copies in lieu of the original with the provision that the original would be maintained if it were ever needed for any pur- pose. The requirement under C.R.C.P. 121, Sec. 1-15 for filing of a copy of any motions or briefs has been modified so that a copy is also filed with the clerk of the court. The clerk of the court is then responsible for distributing the copy to the courtroom clerk. This change is necessary because the courtroom clerk will or- dinarily not have a separate facsimile machine. Some judicial districts have or are acquiring the ability to accept credit cards or bank cards for payment of fees and fines. In the judicial districts where bank cards can be used for pay- ment, parties may file complaints, answers and other pleadings which require a filing fee by faxing an appropriate bank card authorization along with the pleadings. If a judicial district does not accept payment by bank card, those types of pleadings cannot be filed by facsimile transmission because payment of filing fees will not be deferred. The committee believes that reasonable fees can be charged for the costs associated with facsimile filings. However, the setting of such fees is not within the scope of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The adoption of this rule does not require an attorney to have a designated facsimile tele- phone number. Source: Entire section and committee comment added and effective March 7, 2000; entire section and committee comment amended and effective April 17, 2003; entire section and committee comment repealed and readopted October 20, 2005, effective January 1, 2006; 6. amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective January 1, 2012, for all cases pending on or filed on or after January 1, 2012, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 1(b); 1.(f), 4., 6. to 9., and 15.(a) amended and effective June 21, 2012; 4. and 6. amended and effective May 9, 2013; 3. and committee comment amended and effective December 31, 2013; 3.(a) amended and effective September 9, 2015; comments amended and effective January 12, 2017. COMMENTS [1] C.R.C.P. 77 provides that courts are al- ways open for business. This Practice Standard is intended to comport with that rule. [2] The Court authorized service provider for the program is the Integrated Colorado Courts E-Filing System (www.jbits.courts.state.co.us/icces/). ‘‘Editable Format’’ is one which is subject to modi- fication by the court using standard means such as Word or WordPerfect format. [3] Effective November 1, 2016, the name of the court authorized service provider changed from the ‘‘Integrated Colorado Courts E-Filing System’’ to ‘‘Colorado Courts E-Filing’’ (www.jbits.courts.state.co.us/efiling/). ANNOTATION Law reviews. For article, ‘‘Keeping up With Local Dissolution Procedures’’, see 12 Colo. Law. 767 (1983). For article, ‘‘Alternative De- positions: Practice and Procedure’’, see 19 Colo. Law. 57 (1990). For article, ‘‘Colorado’s New Rules of Civil Procedure, Part I: Case Management and Disclosure’’, see 23 Colo. Law. 2467 (1994). For article, ‘‘Motions for Default Judgments’’, see 24 Colo. Law. 1295 (1995). For article, ‘‘Discrete Task Representa- tion a/k/a Unbundled Legal Services’’, see 29 Colo. Law. 5 (Jan. 2000). For article, ‘‘Elec- tronic Filing’s First Y ear in Colorado’’, see 31 Colo. Law. 41 (Apr. 2002). For article, ‘‘Revis- iting the Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs in Colorado’’, see 33 Colo. Law.11 (Apr. 2004). For article, ‘‘Bonds in Colorado Courts: A Primer for Practitioners’’, see 34 Colo. Law. 59 (Mar. 2005). For article, ‘‘2006 Amendments to the Civil Rules: Modernization, New Math, and Polishing’’, see 35 Colo. Law. 21 (May 2006). For article, ‘‘Limited Scope Representation Un- der the Proposed Amendment to C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-1’’, see 40 Colo. Law. 89 (Nov. 2011). For article, ‘‘A Modest Proposal: The Rule 3(a) Waiver Agreement’’, see 46 Colo. Law. 23 (Mar. 2017). For article, ‘‘How Judges Can En- courage Unbundling’’, see 48 Colo. Law. 10 (Apr. 2019). For article, ‘‘Staying Enforcement of a Judgment Pending Appeal’’, see 48 Colo. Law. 30 (May 2019). For article, ‘‘Think Before Y ou Send: Civility and Professionalism in Emails’’, see 51 Colo. Law. 8 (Feb. 2022). Annotator’s note. The following annotations include cases decided under prior versions of the sections. Purpose of rule. This rule is intended to provide uniformity among the various district courts as to procedural matters. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Authority of district court rules is recog- nized so long as they do not conflict with the Colorado rules of civil procedure or with any directive of the supreme court. Danburg v. Re- alties, Inc., 677 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1984). Not all standing orders are local rules. Sec- tion (a) of this rule clearly distinguishes be- tween ‘‘standing orders having the effect of local rules’’ and those that do not. Therefore, not all standing orders are required to be re- viewed by the supreme court. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). This rule contemplates supreme court ap- proval only for standing orders that affect the rights of litigants before the court. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Standing order of chief judge of judicial dis- trict prohibiting possession of a deadly weapon or firearm in designated areas of courthouse was a valid exercise of the chief judge’s author- ity as to administrative matters, did not affect the procedural rights of litigants, and did not require supreme court approval under this rule. People ex rel. Sullivan v. Swihart, 897 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1995). Late filings. This rule applies only to the failure to file a brief and does not apply to late filings. Charles Milne Assoc. v. Toponce, 770 P.2d 1313 (Colo. App. 1988). Trial court’s failure to comply with proce- dural requirements concerning notice and time for filing responsive brief before ruling on motion to dismiss is an abuse of discretion. Lanes v. Scott, 688 P.2d 251 (Colo. App. 1984). Court order vacated where the court granted a proposed order three days after it was filed in violation of § 1-16, which allows a party seven days to object to the form of a proposed order. Laleh v. Johnson, 2016 COA 4, 405 P.3d 286, aff’d, 2017 CO 93, 403 P.3d 207. Court’s sua sponte order of dismissal for failure to prosecute cannot stand if it is not preceded by the notice required by § 1-10 and C.R.C.P. 41. In re Custody of Nugent, 955 P.2d 584 (Colo. App. 1997); Koh v. Kumar, 207 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2009). A delay reduction order does not suffice to provide notice of dismissal under § 1-10. Koh v. Kumar, 207 P.3d 900 (Colo. App. 2009). Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider failure of the mother to file a responsive pleading to the father’s post- trial motion as a confession of motion. M.H.W. by M.E.S. v. D.J.W., 757 P.2d 1129 (Colo. App. 1988). Failure to give an opportunity to respond to authority cited in support of or in opposi- tion to a motion is harmless unless prejudice is shown. Benson v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 624 (Colo. App. 1994). Where there has been an unusual delay in prosecuting an action, prejudice to the defen- dant will be presumed. Therefore, in the ab- sence of mitigating circumstances, an unusual delay in prosecuting an action justifies dismissal with prejudice. Richardson v. McFee, 687 P.2d 517 (Colo. App. 1984). District court erred in exercising its discre- tion to dismiss appellant’s case pursuant to § 1-10(3) of this rule due to appellant’s inac- tivity while it waited 13 months for a ruling from the court on its motion for summary judg- ment on the counterclaims. Appellant, having done all that was required to obtain a ruling from the court on the merits, was not obligated to renew its motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims or even remind the court that the motion needed to be ruled on to avoid the prospect of dismissal. Hudak v. Med. Lien Mgmt., Inc., 2013 COA 83, 305 P.3d 429. Trial court held not to have abused discre- tion in dismissing action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Rossi v. Mathers, 749 P.2d 964 (Colo. App. 1987). Scope of issues raised by a trial data cer- tificate is limited only by the breadth of notice provided by the complaint. Under our rules of civil procedure, the precise legal theory asserted by a claimant is not controlling, so long as the complaint gives sufficient notice of the transac- tion sued upon. Y oder v. Hooper, 695 P.2d 1182 (Colo. App. 1984), aff’d, 732 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1987). Trial court erred when it concluded depo- nent received ‘‘reasonable notice’’ of deposi- tion under § 1-12 (1). Deponent received de- position notice only two days before the deposition, and one of those days was a Sunday. As such, deponent did not receive at least five days notice before the deposition. However, un- der C.R.C.P. 32(d)(1), ‘‘all errors and irregulari- ties in the notice for taking a deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon the party giving the notice’’. Keenan ex rel. Hickman v. Gregg, 192 P.3d 485 (Colo. App. 2008) Provision inapplicable to summary judg- ment motions. Because of the drastic nature of summary judgment, provisions under § 1-15 concerning confession of motions are inappli- cable to motions for summary judgment under this rule. Seal v. Hart, 755 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1988). Failure to present controverting affidavit or other evidentiary materials are not grounds for summary judgment. Murphy v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 747 P.2d 691 (Colo. App. 1987). Failure of nonmoving party to present af- fidavits or other evidentiary materials oppos- ing a motion for summary judgment does not alone provide a proper basis for the entry of a judgment on the pleadings. Quiroz v. Goff, 46 P.3d 486 (Colo. App. 2002). Only under extreme circumstances should sanction of dismissal or entry of default judg- ment be imposed. This rule should not be ap- plied in a manner which unreasonably denies a party its day in court. Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption); Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 211 P.3d 698 (Colo. 2009). Section 1-14 (2) requires the court to ex- plain to the moving party why a motion for default judgment is deficient when the court denies the motion for default judgment. Spiremedia Inc. v. Wozniak, 2020 COA 10, 487 P.3d 1211. It is within the district court’s discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing or rule on the submitted motions to vacate or modify an arbi- tration award. BFN-Greely, LLC v. Adair Group, Inc., 141 P.3d 937 (Colo. App. 2006). Mere citation of a rule of civil procedure is not a ‘‘recitation of legal authority’’ as re- quired by § 1-15 (7) of this rule. Box v. Wickham, 713 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1985). Trial court improperly awarded attorney fees upon determining that a motion was frivo- lous due to an erroneous finding that the court had no jurisdiction. In re Smith, 757 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1988). Post-trial motion for the award of attorney fees is analogous to a request for taxing costs and should follow procedures established by C.R.C.P. 54(d) and § 1-22 of this rule. A trial court may address the issue of the award of attorney fees for services rendered in connec- tion with the underlying litigation on a post-trial basis, whether or not counsel has previously sought to ‘‘reserve’’ the issue. Roa v. Miller, 784 P.2d 826 (Colo. App. 1989). An award of attorney fees under § 13-17- 102 cannot be held to be confessed by failure to respond to a motion for fees. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992). A claim or defense is frivolous for pur- poses of assessing attorney fees if the propo- nent can present no rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of that claim or defense. McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev’d in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990). Determination of whether motion is frivo- lous is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. McKown-Katy v. Rego Co., 776 P.2d 1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev’d in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990). Whether motion was frivolous under § 1-15 (7) is applied in Liebowitz v. Aimexco Inc., 701 P.2d 140 (Colo. App. 1985). Award of attorney fees incurred in pursu- ing motions for sanctions improper under § 1-15 (7) where the defense to the motions, while ultimately unsuccessful, had a rational basis in fact and law and did not lack substan- tial justification. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005). The provisions of § 1-15 concerning con- fession of a motion by failing to respond thereto are inapplicable to a motion for sum- mary judgment. Koch v. Sadler, 759 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 1988). Rule is permissive, not mandatory, so that failure to file brief in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment may be considered a confession of the motion, but is not automati- cally considered such. Visintainer Sheep v. Cen- tennial Gold, 748 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1987). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be considered on its merits like a motion for summary judgment and cannot be deemed confessed by a failure to respond. Therefore, trial court erred in failing to consider the merits of plaintiffs’ claims for relief as re- quired by C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) in resolving defen- dant’s motion to dismiss. Hemmann Mgmt. Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856 (Colo. App. 2007). A party has 15 days to respond to a motion and it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to grant a motion only 12 days after it was filed. Weatherly v. Roth, 743 P. 2d 453 (Colo. App. 1987). Trial court’s ex-parte communication with defendant’s counsel directing counsel to pre- pare the form of order was not improper and did not require the attorney fee order to be vacated, where the communication was made after the court had reached its decision based on full briefing of the issues and a telephone hear- ing, where plaintiff’s counsel was given an op- portunity to object and did in fact object, and where there was no evidence of bias on the part of the judge or prejudice to plaintiff as a result of the court’s action. Aztec Minerals Corp. v. State, 987 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1999). Trial judge’s refusal to disqualify himself from proceeding amounted to abuse of dis- cretion where trial judge acted as settlement judge in litigation underlying the present legal malpractice case and allegations, in light of policies expressed in § 1-17 of this rule that a settlement judge for a particular action should not thereafter have any dealings with the case and that a judge assigned for proceedings other than settlement should not be privy to discus- sions that occurred at court settlement confer- ences, were sufficient to raise a reasonable in- ference of the appearance of actual or apparent bias or prejudice. Tripp v. Borchard, 29 P.3d 345 (Colo. App. 2001). For factors to use in determining appro- priateness and severity of sanctions for fail- ure to file a trial data certificate, see Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (de- cided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption). Sanction imposed for violation of § 1-18’s requirement of timely filing of trial data cer- tificate denied defendant its right to defend against plaintiff’s claim. AAA Crane Serv. v. Omnibank, 723 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1986). Sanctions may include dismissal, but only if court follows notice requirements of C.R.C.P. 41(b) and § 1-10 (2) of this rule. Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). In addition, it was an abuse of discretion for court to impose a sanction for both parties’ failure to file trial data certificates which was detrimental only to plaintiff, and benefitted the equally noncomplying defendants. Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). Imposition of sanctions for noncompliance is not mandated; the language of § 1-18 (1) (d) is permissive in nature. Nagy v. District Court, 762 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1988) (decided under rule in effect prior to 1987 repeal and readoption). The trial court has considerable discretion to determine whether noncompliance with man- datory pretrial procedures justifies the imposi- tion of sanctions against the noncomplying party. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court’s decision not to impose any sanction for noncompliance with pretrial proce- dures is an abuse of discretion only if, based on the particular circumstances, the decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court did not abuse its discretion for failing to prohibit the state’s witnesses from testifying in case in chief for failure to file trial data certificate setting forth the names of the witnesses. People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1987). Trial court did not apply an erroneous legal standard in determining reasonableness of plaintiff’s attorney fees. Without any sup- porting affidavit or exhibit, defendants’ opposi- tion to award of attorney fees incurred in con- nection with contempt proceedings constituted mere argument and did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of the fees. Moreover, the award of attorney fees was based on sufficient evidence supporting the reasonableness of the fees. Madison Capital Co., LLC v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557 (Colo. App. 2009). Notwithstanding the discretionary lan- guage in § 1-22 (2)(c), a party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine a rea- sonable amount of attorney fees, when the party presents an expert’s affidavit raising dis- puted issues of fact and a significant amount of fees has been requested. Roberts v. Adams, 47 P.3d 690 (Colo. App. 2001). Discretion to grant or deny belated re- quest. Where party did not file motion for fees until 24 days after expiration of 15-day period and did not request extension of time nor offer excuse for delay, court did not abuse its discre- tion by denying the motion. Major v. Chons Bros., Inc., 53 P.3d 781 (Colo. App. 2002). Although § 1-22 requires a party seeking costs to file a request within 15 days of the judgment, it also permits the request to be filed within such greater time as the court may allow. Although plaintiff filed the request for costs outside of the deadline, the court chose to address the issue. There is no abuse of dis- cretion in the trial court’s decision to address plaintiff’s request under the ‘‘within such greater time as the court may allow’’ standard. Phillips v. Watkins, 166 P.3d 197 (Colo. App. 2007). A request for an award of costs and fees under § 1-22 which has been filed beyond the 15-day deadline does not preclude the trial court’s consideration even though the party fails to request an extension of time. In re Wright, 841 P.2d 358 (Colo. App. 1992). Not an abuse of discretion for trial court to award attorney fees under § 1-22 beyond the 15-day deadline and without expressly granting an extension. US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2009); Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). The court relied on specified information in- dicating the reasons for the late filing of the motion for attorney fees. US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2009). Trial court not required to deny a motion for costs and attorney fees if it is filed outside of the 15-day time limit, even if the submitting party does not request an extension of time. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). Issues concerning recovery of attorney fees not sought as damages are outside the purview of C.R.C.P. 59 and outside the purview of C.R.C.P. 59(j)’s requirement that a motion be denied as a matter of law if it is not decided within 60 days. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010). Even though plaintiff filed his bill of costs and an amended bill of costs more than 15 days after the entry of judgment, the trial court considered both the bill of costs and the amended bill in awarding minimal costs. Thus, the bill of costs was filed within ‘‘such greater time as the court may allow’’ and the trial court was required under § 13-17-202 to award the plaintiff ‘‘reasonable costs’’ incurred after the offer of settlement. Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P .C., 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997). The rule does not require a court to deter- mine that a filing made outside the 15-day period was attributable to excusable neglect or to make any other findings such as those re- quired under C.R.C.P. 6(b). Parry v. Kuhlmann, 169 P.3d 188 (Colo. App. 2007). Section 1-22 (2) does not require a party seeking attorney fees as costs to provide the disclosures mandated under C.R.C.P. 26 for experts who will testify at trial. Chartier v. Weinland Homes, Inc., 25 P.3d 1279 (Colo. App. 2001). Section 1-22 (2)(b) does not require a writ- ten fee agreement to accompany every mo- tion for attorney fees and costs. The section only provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of supporting documentation, and does not re- quire a particular type of supporting documen- tation for every motion. Nesbitt v. Scott, 2019 COA 154, 457 P.3d 134. Failure of wife to file a motion in confor- mity with this rule in dissolution of marriage action does not operate as a waiver of her request for fees where wife had properly re- quested fees in her response to husband’s peti- tion; attorney fees were also listed as a disputed issue in the parties’ joint trial management cer- tificate; and husband acknowledged that wife raised the issue at the permanent orders hearing. In re Hill, 166 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2007). The right to a jury trial, once proper de- mand is made and fee is paid pursuant to § 1-3 of this rule, may be lost only for rea- sons stated in C.R.C.P. 39(a). The trial court, in an action for payment of medical benefits, abused its discretion in denying the insured a jury trial on the basis that the insured failed to file jury instructions in accordance with § 1-19 of this rule. Neither this rule nor C.R.C.P. 39(a) includes a waiver provision on such basis. Whaley v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1989). Where defendant in prior action sought and obtained dismissal for failure to pros- ecute but did not specifically request dismissal with prejudice, order of dismissal did not so specify, and no good cause was shown for de- fendant’s failure to request dismissal with prejudice, subsequent ‘‘clarification’’ of order to specify dismissal with prejudice was ineffec- tive. McElvaney v. Batley, 824 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1991). Expert’s designation and summary of tes- timony was available and met the requirement of this rule to provide both sides with the op- portunity to prepare adequately for trial and to prevent undue surprise. Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp., 827 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1991). Confession of motion due to failure to re- spond in accordance with subsection (3) does not automatically render a pro se litigant’s claims ‘‘frivolous and groundless’’. Separate findings on the issue are required before court may award attorney fees against such parties under § 13-17-102. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992). Defendants waived their rights to a hear- ing on costs pursuant to this section where they did not request such hearing at trial. V an Schaack v. V an Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1992). It was within the trial court’s discretion to award expert witness fees for designated ex- perts who did not testify at trial where such award was supported by evidence in the record. V an Schaack v. V an Schaack Holdings, Ltd., 856 P.2d 15 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court had discretion to impose sanc- tions, including issuing an order limiting scope of expert’s testimony at trial where plaintiff failed to disclose identity of experts or their opinions and failed to supplement re- sponses to discovery when additional informa- tion became known. Locke v. V anderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court properly excluded psychiatrist’s testimony regarding the association between IQ and hydrocephalic condition where plaintiff failed to disclose opinion, failed to disclose psychiatrist’s qualifications, and failed to up- date discovery responses. Locke v. V anderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court properly held that tardily dis- closed expert opinion went beyond fair scope of previously disclosed opinion where plaintiff failed to make timely disclosure of expert’s opinion concerning damages relating to matters beyond those provided in discovery. Locke v. V anderark, 843 P.2d 27 (Colo. App. 1992). Generally, the trial court determines a mo- tion on the written motion and submitted briefs, and it is within the discretion of the court whether to allow an evidentiary hearing. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Section 1-5 creates a presumption that all court records are to be open. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Section 1-5 places the burden upon the party seeking to limit access to a court file to over- come this presumption in favor of public acces- sibility by demonstrating that the harm to the privacy of a person in interest outweighs the public interest in the openness of court files. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). The fact that the parties claim that a court file contains extremely personal, private, and confi- dential matters is generally insufficient to con- stitute a privacy interest warranting the sealing of that entire file under § 1-5. In re Purcell, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994); Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). The expectation of privacy or confidentiality in court records has been found to exist only in those limited instances involving sexual assault claims, trade secrets, potentially defamatory material, or threats to national security. Ander- son v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). A broad limited access order denying ac- cess to the entire court file was not war- ranted where a medical malpractice charge against a licensed health care professional im- plicates the public interest and involves more than a private dispute between individuals. An- derson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Court may not enter a limited access order based solely upon an agreement between the parties to the litigation. If the evidence does not support the required finding under § 1-5 (2), no such order may be entered. Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996). Court did not abuse its discretion in deny- ing party’s request to seal record where it was not required to seal the record under this section and the record contained nothing un- usual and no material that would mandate that it be sealed. In re Purcell, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994). Movant’s constitutional right to due pro- cess was not violated by trial court’s denial of motion for costs and damages without a separate hearing on the motion where movant did not request an evidentiary hearing on its motion and trial court, in ruling on the motion, assumed movant could prove damages but de- termined, based on written motion and briefs, that an award of damages would be oppressive and inequitable. City & County of Denver v. Ameritrust, 832 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1992). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defendants to file their reply to plaintiff’s response more than ten days after the response was filed where, in accepting the reply, the court stated that it had been filed within a reasonable time and that, in the interest of fundamental fairness, substance would be placed ahead of procedure. Armstead v. Memo- rial Hosp., 892 P.2d 450 (Colo. App. 1995). Letter of credit was properly released by trial court, since the court was the beneficiary of the letter of credit. V ento v. Colo. Nat’l Bank, 985 P.2d 48 (Colo. App. 1999). District court clerk’s rejection of com- plaint filed does not, and cannot, alter the fact that the complaint had been ‘‘filed’’ in the district court under C.R.C.P. 106(b) on the date it was transmitted to the e-system provider. The rejection therefore also does not and cannot alter the fact that the litigants had invoked district court jurisdiction, including that of the intended county district court, on the date they e-filed their complaint with the other district court. Maslak v. Town of V ail, 2015 COA 2, 345 P.3d 972. Section 1-1 (2) is applied in Barry v. Ashley Anderson, P .C., 718 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Colo. 1989). Section 1-10 is applied in Powers v. Prof’l Rodeo Cowboys, 832 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1992). Section 1-10 (2) is applied in Maxwell v. W.K.A. Inc., 728 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1986). Section 1-11 is applied in Herrera v. Ander- son, 736 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1987); Todd v. Bear V alley Village Apts., 980 P.2d 973 (Colo. 1999). Section 1-15 is applied in Herrera v. Ander- son, 736 P.2d 416 (Colo. App. 1987); Ogawa v. Riley, 949 P.2d 118 (Colo. App. 1997). Section 1-18 is applied in Baumann v. Rhode, 710 P.2d 493 (Colo. App. 1985); Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1986); Cof- fee v. Inman, 728 P.2d 376 (Colo. App. 1986). Section 1-19 is applied in Whaley v. Key- stone Life Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 404 (Colo. App. 1989). APPENDIX TO CHAPTERS 1 TO 17A The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (Forms are available on the Colorado judicial branch website at https://www.courts.state.co.us.) SPECIAL FORM INDEX Form 1. District Court Civil Summons. Form 1.1. Summons by Publication. Form 1.2. District Court Civil (CV) Case Cover Sheet for Initial Pleading of Complaint, Counterclaim, Cross-claim or Third Party Complaint and Jury Demand. [See Form JDF 601] Form 2. Allegation of Jurisdiction (for cases in the County Court). Form 3. Complaint on a promissory note. Form 4. Complaint on an account. Form 5. Complaint for goods sold and delivered. Form 6. Complaint for money lent. Form 7. Complaint for money paid by mistake. Form 8. Complaint for money had and received. Form 9. Complaint for negligence. Form 10. Complaint for negligence where plaintiff is unable to determine definitely whether the person responsible is C.D. or E.F. or whether both are responsible and where his evidence may justify a finding of wilfulness or of recklessness or of negligence. Form 11. Complaint for conversion. Form 12. Complaint for specific performance of contract to convey land. Form 13. Complaint on claim for debt and to set aside fraudulent conveyance under Rule 18(b). Form 14. Complaint for interpleader and declaratory relief. Form 15. Motion to dismiss, presenting defenses of failure to state a claim, and of lack of service of process. Form 15A. Certification of Conferring. Form 16. Answer presenting defenses under Rule 12(b). Form 17. Answer to complaint set forth in Form 8, with counterclaim for interpleader. Form 18. Motion to bring in third-party defendant. Form 19. Motion to intervene as a defendant under Rule 24. Form 20. Pattern Interrogatories under Rule 33. Form 20.2. Pattern Interrogatories (Domestic Relations) (Repealed). [See Form 35.3] Form 21. Request for Admission under Rule 36. [Moved - See Form 21B] Form 21A. Motion for Production of Documents, etc., under Rule 34. Form 21B. Request for Admission under Rule 36. Form 21.2. Pattern Requests for Production of Documents (Domestic Relations) (Repealed). [See Form 35.4] Form 22. Allegation of reason for omitting party. Form 23. Affidavit, Writ of Garnishment and Interrogatories (Rule 103) (Repealed). Form 24. Writ of assistance - Petition For. Form 25. Request for production of documents, etc., under Rule 34. [Moved - See Form 21A] Form 26. Writ of Continuing Garnishment. Form 27. Calculation of the Amount of Exempt Earnings Worksheet. Form 28. Objection to Calculation of the Amount of Exempt Earnings. Form 29. Writ of Garnishment with Notice of Exemption and Pending Levy. Form 30. Claim of Exemption to Writ of Garnishment with Notice. Form 31. Writ of Garnishment for Support. Form 32. Writ of Garnishment - Judgment Debtor Other than Natural Person. Form 33. Writ of Garnishment in Aid of Writ of Attachment. Form 34. Notice of Levy. Form 35.1. Mandatory Disclosure. Form 35.2. Sworn Financial Statement. Form 35.3. Supporting Schedules (Sworn Financial Statement). Form 35.4. Pattern Interrogatories (Domestic Relations). Form 35.5. Pattern Requests for Production of Documents (Domestic Relations). Form 36. Notice of Withdrawal as Attorney of Record. Form 37. Certification of Records Under CRE 902(11) and 902(12). Form 38. Disclosure of Records to be Offered through a Certification of Records Pursuant to CRE 902(11) and 902(12). Form JDF 47. Notice to Judgment Debtor Pursuant to §24-33.5-704.3, C.R.S. (Repealed). Form JDF 80. District Court Subpoena to Attend and Produce or Produce. Form JDF 80.1. District Court Notice to Subpoena Recipients. Form JDF 80.2. County Court Subpoena to Attend or Attend and Produce. Form JDF 187. Requests for Documents in Eviction Cases. Form JDF 250. Notice, Claim and Summons to Appear for Trial (Parts 1-4). Form JDF 601. District Court (CV) Case Cover Sheet for Initial Pleading of Complaint, Counter- claim, Cross-claim or Third Party Complaint and Jury Demand. Form JDF 603. Instructions to Complete District Civil (CV) Case Cover Sheet for Initial Pleading of Complaint, Counterclaim, Cross-claim or Third Party Complaint. Form JDF 622. Proposed Case Management Order. Form JDF 638. Complaint for Review of Administration of the Colorado Department of Correc- tions Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106.5.