C.A.R. 4

History

Source: (a) amended August 23, 1984, effective January 1, 1985; (b)(2) amended July 7, 1988, effective August 1, 1988; (a) amended and effective June 18, 1992; (a) and (d) amended March 17, 1994, effective July 1, 1994; (c)(1)(I) amended and effective April 7, 1994; (a) corrected and effective January 9, 1995; entire rule amended and adopted May 17, 2001, effective July 1, 2001; (b)(1) corrected June 12, 2001, effective July 1, 2001; (b)(3) added and adopted June 27, 2002, effective July 1, 2002; (a) amended and effective September 9, 2004; (a) amended and effective November 9, 2006; (a) amended and effective February 7, 2008; (d)(2) amended and effective May 10, 2010; (a), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (c)(1)(II)(A) amended and adopted December 14, 2011, effective July 1, 2012; entire rule amended February 24, 2022, effective July 1, 2022 (Rule Change 2022(05)). ANNOTATION I. General Consideration. II. Civil Cases. III. Criminal Cases. IV. Review of Sentences. I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Law reviews. For article, ‘‘Defects in Inef- fective Assistance Standards Used By State Courts’’, see 50 U. Colo. L. Rev. 389 (1979). For article, ‘‘The Problem of Delay in the Colo- rado Court of Appeals’’, see 58 Den. L.J. 1 (1980). For article, ‘‘Colorado Felony Sentenc- ing’’, see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982). For ar- ticle, ‘‘Appealing Orders in Probate Cases: The Finality Question’’, see 50 Colo. Law. 22 (Feb. 2021). For article, ‘‘Demystifying Colorado’s Atypical Civil and Administrative Appeals’’, see 52 Colo. Law. 24 (Jan.-Feb. 2023). Compliance with the rules of court is pre- requisite to appellate jurisdiction, and actions undertaken to avoid application of those rules, whether by the parties or by the trial court, cannot operate to confer jurisdiction. Dill v. (1975); Moore & Co. v. Williams, 657 P.2d 984 (Colo. App. 1982). Although adherence to strict jurisdictional notions may sometimes create a needless waste of judicial resources. In re Ross, 670 P.2d 26 (Colo. App. 1983). Rule is procedural requirement without jurisdictional significance. Trial court’s prepa- ration and transmission of findings with an or- der nunc pro tunc to date of original sentencing was valid because trial court did not lose juris- diction by initial oversight. People v. Abeyta, 677 P.2d 393 (Colo. App. 1983). New requirement that notice of appeal be filed with the appellate court with an advi- sory copy served on the clerk of the trial court is jurisdictional, and strict compliance with the rule is required. Therefore, a notice of appeal erroneously filed in the trial court was of no effect under the new rules, and the trial court was without authority to grant an extension of time to correctly file a notice of appeal. Collins v. Boulder Urban Renewal Auth., 684 P.2d 952 (Colo. App. 1984). The timely filing of notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. Estep v. People, 753 P.2d 1241 (Colo. 1988); Hillen v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 883 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1994). Reduction of charge. In reducing a charge, the court in effect dismisses the greater charge and substitutes a lesser one. Through such ac- tion, the court does not dismiss the case in its entirety; therefore, the appeal of the case is governed by the procedures set forth in section (b)(3) of this rule and in C.A.R. 4.1, not section (b)(2), and must be filed within 10 days of the date of the order. People v. Severin, 122 P.3d 1073 (Colo. App. 2005). Court does not pass upon plaintiff’s claim that stay order was improperly entered where he did not formally protest that order by filing either a notice of appeal under this rule or a motion under C.A.R. 8. DiMarco v. Dept. of Rev., MVD, 857 P.2d 1349 (Colo. App. 1993). This rule is inapplicable to review of or- ders of the industrial appeals panel. Picken v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 874 P.2d 485 (Colo. App. 1994). Trial court may not correct jurisdictional defects in the appeal. Dill v. County Court, 37 Colo. App. 75, 541 P.2d 1272 (1975). Rule on appellate review of criminal sen- tences controls over conflicting statute, § 18- 1-409, which had not been amended after rule was changed. People v. Arevalo, 835 P. 2d 552 (Colo. App. 1992). However, § 18-1-409 prevails over a con- flicting supreme court rule in substantive matters. To the extent that section (c)(1) of this rule provides that every defendant may seek review of the propriety of his or her sentence, it conflicts with the substantive provisions of § 18-1-409 (1). People v. Prophet, 42 P.3d 61 (Colo. App. 2001). A nunc pro tunc judgment may not be used to circumvent the time requirements of the rules of procedure. Dill v. County Court, 37 Colo. App. 75, 541 P.2d 1272 (1975). Applied in Carr v. District Court, 157 Colo. 226, 402 P.2d 182 (1965); City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Adjustment, 31 Colo. App. 324, 505 P.2d 44 (1972); People v. Samora, 188 Colo. 74, 532 P.2d 946 (1975); People v. Mar- tinez, 190 Colo. 507, 549 P.2d 758 (1976); People v. Hinchman, 40 Colo. App. 9, 574 P.2d 866 (1977); Emerick v. Greene, 40 Colo. App. 246, 575 P.2d 441 (1977); Schenk v. Indus. Comm’n, 40 Colo. App. 350, 579 P.2d 1171 (1978); People v. McKnight, 41 Colo. App. 372, 588 P.2d 886 (1978); People v. Reyes, 42 Colo. App. 73, 589 P.2d 1385 (1979); People v. Mikkleson, 42 Colo. App. 77, 593 P.2d 975 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980); Widener v. District Court, 200 Colo. 398, 615 P.2d 33 (1980); People v. Foster, 200 Colo. 283, 615 P.2d 652 (1980); People v. Martinez, 628 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1981); People v. Francis, 630 P.2d 82 (Colo. 1981); People v. Hunt, 632 P.2d 572 (Colo. 1981); People v. Byerley, 635 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1981); People v. District Court, 638 P.2d 65 (Colo. 1981); People v. Boivin, 632 P.2d 1038 (Colo. App. 1981); In re V an Camp, 632 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1981); Danielson v. Kerbs AG., Inc., 646 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1982); People v. Rafferty, 644 P.2d 102 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Dennis, 649 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1982); People v. Cole, 648 P.2d 687 (Colo. App. 1982); People v. Peterson, 656 P.2d 1301 (Colo. 1983); Acme Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Samsonite Corp., 663 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1983); Church v. Am. Stan- dard Ins. Co. of Wis., 742 P.2d 971 (Colo. App. 1987); People v. Harmon, 3 P.3d 480 (Colo. App. 2000); People v. Banuelos-Landa, 109 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2004); Harris v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 155 P.3d 583 (Colo. App. 2006). II. CIVIL CASES. Timely filing of a notice of appeal is man- datory and jurisdictional. Chapman v. Miller, 29 Colo. App. 8, 476 P.2d 763 (1970); Concelman v. Ray, 36 Colo. App. 181, 538 P.2d 1343 (1975); In re Foster, 39 Colo. App. 130, 564 P.2d 429 (1977). Compliance with section (a) is mandatory. Failure to comply deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction and precludes a review of the merits. Bosworth Data Servs., Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 587 P.2d 1201 (1978). Time limitation contained in section (a) is jurisdictional. Fed. Lumber Co. v. Hanley, 33 Colo. App. 18, 515 P.2d 480 (1973). The filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review of a lower court decision. People v. Silvola, 198 Colo. 228, 597 P.2d 583 (1979). Strict compliance with section (a) is essen- tial. Laugesen v. Witkin Homes Inc., 29 Colo. App. 58, 479 P.2d 289 (1970). Where a trial court rules sua sponte on an issue, the merits of its ruling are subject to review on appeal, whether timely objections were made or not. Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, 452 P.3d 161. A judgment of paternity is subject to this rule. This rule does not list specific orders that are appealable, and in the absence of any limit- ing language, a judgment of paternity is subject to it. People in Interest of N.S., 2017 COA 8, 413 P.3d 172. Any appeal of the dismissal of a claim as barred by the Colorado Governmental Im- munity Act, article 10 of title 24, C.R.S., must be sought immediately within the time limits specified in this rule, or it is barred. Buckles v. State, Div. of Wildlife, 952 P.2d 855 (Colo. App. 1998). Jurisdictional defect created which war- ranted dismissal. Where trial court took no action with respect to appellant’s posttrial mo- tion within 60 days after that motion was filed, that motion was ‘‘deemed denied’’, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j), so that appellant’s failure to file notice of appeal within 45 days after the post- trial motion was ‘‘deemed denied’’ created a jurisdictional defect in the appeal which war- ranted dismissal under this rule. Baum v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls., 715 P.2d 346 (Colo. App. 1986); Anderson v. Molitor, 738 P.2d 402 (Colo. App. 1987). Lack of a proper order determining a C.R.C.P. 59 motion was not fatal to appeal where party appealed from underlying order of dissolution of marriage, not from denial of the rule 59 motion. In re Christen, 899 P.2d 339 (Colo. App. 1995). Temporary orders as to maintenance are reviewable as a final judgment even if there has not been a final judgment in the form of a decree of dissolution. In re Nussbeck, 899 P.2d 347 (Colo. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 974 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1999). Post-trial motions for attorney fees are subject to the provisions of C.R.C.P. 59 and the effect of such motions upon the time limita- tions of this rule are as specified in C.R.C.P. 59. Torrez v. Day, 725 P.2d 1184 (Colo. App. 1986). Requirements of this rule must be met for appeals of judgments for attorney fees. The award of attorney fees in a case is sufficiently separate from an underlying judgment on the merits to require that a separate notice of appeal be filed within the time limits of this rule from the judgment awarding attorney fees indepen- dently of the judgment entered on the merits of the underlying case. If this is not done, the court of appeals is not vested with subject matter jurisdiction to determine issues related to the award of attorney fees. Dawes Agency v. Am. Prop. Mortg., 804 P.2d 255 (Colo. App. 1990). Judgment awarding prejudgment interest is not final until the amount of such interest is reduced to a sum certain. Grand County Custom Homebuilding, LLC v. Bell, 148 P.3d 398 (Colo. App. 2006); Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, 465 P.3d 133. Timely filing of motion for reconsideration of a completed post-trial ruling on an attor- ney fees issue tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal under this rule until the court deter- mines the motion or the motion is deemed de- nied after 60 days pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j). Jensen v. Runta, 80 P.3d 906 (Colo. App. 2003). The court of appeals is not usually pre- cluded from reviewing an appeal merely be- cause the notice of appeal was premature. Bush v. Winker, 892 P.2d 328 (Colo. App. 1994). Calculation of timeliness of notice of ap- peal. The timeliness of a notice of appeal is calculated from the date the judgment appealed from is entered on the register of actions. Moore & Co. v. Williams, 672 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1983). Construction given ‘‘announced’’ within context of section (a) for purposes of resolv- ing timeliness of notices of appeal. Oral ruling on posttrial motions in presence of parties and their counsel did not constitute ‘‘announce- ment’’ of trial court’s judgment. Judgment was not ‘‘announced’’ until signing of the order in its final form thereby deferring commencement of the running of the time to appeal until the parties were notified by mail of such action. City of Colo. Springs v. Timberland Assocs., 783 P.2d 287 (Colo. 1989). For purposes of timeliness of notice of ap- peal, order of dismissal is final judgment and motion for reconsideration operated to suspend the running of time until the ruling thereon. Small v. Gen. Motors, 694 P.2d 374 (Colo. App. 1984). Failure to file timely notice of appeal re- quires dismissal. An appeal must be dismissed when appellant has failed to file a timely notice of appeal under section (a). Fed. Lumber Co. v. Hanley, 33 Colo. App. 18, 515 P.2d 480 (1973). Jurisdictionally defective notice insuffi- cient. A notice of appeal which is jurisdictionally defective is not a ‘‘timely notice of appeal’’ as contemplated in section (a). Wa- tered Down Farms v. Rowe, 39 Colo. App. 169, 566 P.2d 710 (1977), rev’d on other grounds, 195 Colo. 152, 576 P.2d 172 (1978). Notice of appeal not timely filed. Earlier notice of appeal, which related to probate of will, did not provide notice of appeal of order vacating notices of lis pendens to estate prop- erty, and since no timely appeal was filed, court lacked jurisdiction over appeal. Matter of Estate of Anderson, 727 P.2d 867 (Colo. App. 1986). Wife’s creditor’s claim was barred because she failed to timely file a notice of appeal for that specific claim. Although wife filed two claims on the same day addressing different elements of a singular probate case, each claim was distinctive, and the probate court ruled on each claim on separate dates. Because wife’s creditor’s claim was governed by a proceeding independent of the petition for spouse’s elective share, the probate court’s order barring wife’s creditor’s claim was a final order, and wife failed to timely appeal that particular claim pur- suant to section (a). In re Estate of Gadash, 2017 COA 54, 413 P.3d 272. Proponent’s notice of appeal as to the pro- bate court’s November order denying a par- tial summary judgment was timely filed in March since the November court order adjudi- cated fewer than all of proponent’s pending claims in the proceedings and, therefore, did not constitute a final judgment, but the court’s in- tervening February order resolved the remain- ing issue pending between the parties. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff’d, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2006). Notice of appeal timely filed when filed within 45 days of amended order. In trial involving title to a road segment, original order expressly deferred determination of road seg- ment’s width to a later date, and the notice of appeal was timely filed after trial court amended the order to incorporate the road seg- ment’s width. Camp Bird Colo., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Ouray, 215 P.3d 1277 (Colo. App. 2009). Defendant’s notice of appeal from auto- matic denial of motion to alter and amend judg- ment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59(j) was untimely and prevents prosecution of the appeal. Sandoval v. Trinidad Area Health Ass’n, 752 P.2d 1062 (Colo. App. 1988). When second motion to alter or amend not prerequisite to filing of notice. Where an ap- pellant seeks no greater or different relief on appeal than that asked of the trial court in the motion directed to the original judgment, where appellant is not urging any new alleged errors arising from the amended judgment, and where the amended judgment is not the result of a post-judgment hearing involving controverted issues of fact, the appellant need not file another motion to alter or amend or for a new trial after entry of the amended judgment as a prerequisite to the filing of his notice of appeal. In re Foster, 39 Colo. App. 130, 564 P.2d 429 (1977). Effect of filing motion for new trial. The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated upon the timely filing of a motion for new trial, and the time begins to run anew when that motion is denied. A subsequent mo- tion for new trial that raises issues that either were or could have been raised in the movant’s prior motion does not affect the running of the time for filing the notice of appeal. Wright Farms, Inc. v. Weninger, 669 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1983); United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992). Denial of motion for new trial starts filing period. Until such time as the motion, for new trial is denied, plaintiff’s time within which it may file an appeal in the supreme court does not even start to run. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Frederick, 164 Colo. 5, 431 P.2d 1016 (1967). Where final order appealed from is denial of a C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, and C.R.C.P. 59 motion to recon- sider such denial has been filed, time for filing notice of appeal runs from denial of C.R.C.P. 59 motion, not from the date of the underlying judgment. United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992). Final entry of judgment for purposes of timely notice of appeal under this rule based on denial of new trial motion is date on which court filed written judgment in fixed amount on special verdict. V allejo v. Eldridge, 764 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1988). Rule 60(b) motion is appealable indepen- dently of an underlying judgment, and, where the notice of appeal was timely as to the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment dismissing the action, the appellate court has jurisdiction to consider it. Guevara v. Foxhoven, 928 P.2d 793 (Colo. App. 1996). A notice of appeal must be filed within 45 days from the entry of an order granting or denying a motion filed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59. Campbell v. McGill, 810 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1991). When a party timely files a C.R.C.P. 59 motion, the running of the 45 days for the notice of appeal under section (a) of this rule is terminated and does not begin to run anew until either a ruling on the motion within 60 days or when the motion is deemed denied at the end of the 60-day period. Stone v. People, 895 P.2d 1154 (Colo. App. 1995). If a C.R.C.P. 59 motion is timely filed, the time for filing a notice of appeal commences when the trial court determines that motion or when the motion is deemed denied under the rule. Guevara v. Foxhoven, 928 P.2d 793 (Colo. App. 1996). One method by which to calculate the forty-nine-day period is from the date the court grants or denies a C.R.C.P. 59 motion. Semler v. Hellerstein, 2016 COA 143, 428 P.3d 555, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Bewley v. Semler, 2018 CO 79, 432 P.3d 582. Thus, the timely filing of a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 59 tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. Goodwin v. Homeland Cent. Ins. Co., 172 P.3d 938 (Colo. App. 2007); Semler v. Hellerstein, 2016 COA 143, 428 P.3d 555, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Bewley v. Semler, 2018 CO 79, 432 P.3d 582. Filing notice gives extra time to all parties. The timely filing of a notice of appeal by any party affords an additional 14 days to all other parties, regardless of whether the party subse- quently appealing was an appellee in the initial appeal. Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977). Effect of filing motion to alter or amend judgment. The filing of a motion to alter or amend a judgment tolls the running of the time for filing notice of appeal. V alenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 34 Colo. App. 5, 521 P.2d 1287 (1974). Amendment of judgment does not extend filing period. Generally where an appellant procures an amendment of a judgment, the time period in which to file an appeal will not be extended. In re Everhart, 636 P.2d 1321 (Colo. App. 1981); Mosley v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 78 P.3d 1150 (Colo. App. 2003). Neither does petition to show cause. The filing of a petition to show cause in the supreme court within a 10-day period following entry of final judgment, coupled with the filing of a motion in a trial court to suspend proceedings, does not stay the time to file a motion for a new trial under C.R.C.P. 59 or the time to proceed under C.A.R. 11 or this rule. Walter v. Walter, 136 Colo. 405, 318 P.2d 221 (1957). Nor does pendency of motion for attorney fees and costs. The pendency of such a motion does not preclude a judgment on the merits from becoming final or toll the running of the 45-day period for filing a notice of appeal, at least where attorney fees are sought pursuant to a statutory fee-shifting provision rather than as damages. Goodwin v. Homeland Cent. Ins. Co., 172 P.3d 938 (Colo. App. 2007). Parties may not waive requirement of timely filing. Parties may not by their indepen- dent action amend or waive the jurisdictional requirement of timely filing of a notice of ap- peal under section (a). Concelman v. Ray, 36 Colo. App. 181, 538 P.2d 1343 (1975). Court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect only in cases that are appealed from a trial court. Section (a) does not apply to appeals from rulings of an administrative agency. Martinez v. Colo. State Pers. Bd., 28 P.3d 978 (Colo. App. 2001). Upon showing of excusable neglect, trial court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days. Chapman v. Miller, 29 Colo. App. 8, 476 P.2d 763 (1970). Finding of excusable neglect is supported by the record and binding upon review. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. State Dept. of Rev., 699 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1984). Reason for late filing critical in determina- tion of excusable neglect. Although the num- ber of days that a filing is late may be one factor in determining whether neglect is excusable for purposes of extending time to file notice of appeal, the critical question is the reason for the late filing. Bosworth Data Servs., Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 587 P.2d 1201 (1978). Negligence of counsel generally is not con- sidered ‘‘excusable neglect’’ which would jus- tify the late filing of a notice of appeal under section (a). Trujillo v. Indus. Comm’n, 648 P.2d 1094 (Colo. App. 1982). Nor attorney’s press of work. The press of work or other activities of an attorney do not constitute excusable neglect. Cox v. Adams, 171 Colo. 37, 464 P.2d 513 (1970); Laugesen v. Witkin Homes, Inc., 29 Colo. App. 58, 479 P.2d 289 (1970). Miscounting days within which to file no- tice of appeal does not constitute excusable ne- glect. Bosworth Data Servs., Inc. v. Gloss, 41 Colo. App. 530, 587 P.2d 1201 (1978); Kronkow, Inc. v. Wood, 44 Colo. App. 462, 615 P.2d 71 (1980). Reliance on post office’s assurance of timely delivery of notice of appeal did not constitute excusable neglect. Ford v. Hender- son, 691 P.2d 754 (Colo. 1984). Reliance on office staff to make appropri- ate filings did not constitute excusable neglect. Hillen v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 883 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1994). Doctrine of ‘‘unique circumstances’’ and finding of excusable neglect. When counsel erroneously filed motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal of an order terminating parental rights with trial court instead of appel- late court within 45-day period and counsel relied on trial court’s erroneous extension of deadline and filed notice of appeal after the 45-day period but within the 30-day extension period for excusable neglect, court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider a request for late filing under ‘‘unique circumstances’’ doctrine and failure to find excusable neglect to justify extension of time was abuse of discretion. P .H. v. People in Interest of S.H., 814 P.2d 909 (Colo. 1991). Refusal of extension was not abuse of dis- cretion. Where there is no showing of excus- able neglect, there is no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in its refusal to extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. Long v. Ross, 30 Colo. App. 436, 494 P.2d 128 (1972). Forty-five-day time limit for filing appeal with court of appeals in tax assessment cases, rather than statutory time period, is applicable when appeal has first been filed with state board of assessment appeals and not in district court. Denver v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 748 P.2d 1306 (Colo. App. 1987). ‘‘Unique circumstances’’ doctrine may be applied to allow the filing of notice of appeal in a kinship adoption proceeding governed by C.A.R. 4(a) beyond the 75-day jurisdic- tional deadline. Court shall consider the total- ity of the circumstances in decision to apply doctrine. In re C.A.B.L., 221 P.3d 433 (Colo. App. 2009). Doctrine of unique circumstances not ap- plicable because case does not involve a funda- mental liberty interest and the doctrine should be rarely invoked. Petition of Heostis v. Dept. of Educ., 2016 COA 6, 375 P.3d 1232. While petition for writ of certiorari was pending, the probate court lacked jurisdic- tion to reconsider its decision. A trial court retains jurisdiction to modify an order only if a statute explicitly grants the court that authority during the pendency of an appeal of the order. Black v. Black, 2020 COA 64M, 482 P.3d 460. III. CRIMINAL CASES. Appellate court may, for good cause shown, enlarge the time for filing under sec- tion (b). People v. Allen, 182 Colo. 395, 513 P.2d 1060 (1973); People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893 (Colo. 2005). Where public defender was notified of ap- pointment to represent petitioner on last day on which petitioner could file late notice of appeal, court of appeals should have either al- lowed notice of appeal or given petitioner addi- tional time to gather more supporting informa- tion rather than denying motion for out of time filing. Weason v. Colo. Court of Appeals, 731 P.2d 736 (Colo. 1987). A motion filed after entry of the order challenged on appeal does not extend the time for the prosecution to file its notice past the 45 days allowed by this rule. People v. Retallack, 804 P.2d 279 (Colo. App. 1990). But trial court cannot extend time for fil- ing past 75 days. A trial court has no authority or jurisdiction to extend the time for filing of notice of appeal from criminal conviction past 60 days (now 75 days) after the entry of the judgment. People v. Allen, 182 Colo. 395, 513 P.2d 1060 (1973). The excusable neglect provision does not apply to appeals by the people. People v. Gilmore, 97 P.3d 123 (Colo. App. 2003). The civil cross-appeal rule that allows for sequential submissions does not apply in criminal cases. People v. Gilmore, 97 P.3d 123 (Colo. App. 2003). An order granting a new trial is a final order pursuant to § 16-12-102, therefore, prosecution must file its appeal within 45 days of the order. People v. Curren, 228 P.3d 253 (Colo. App. 2009). Order granting motion for a new trial not final judgment for purposes of appeal, and therefore people’s failure to file appeal within 45 days of such order did not render subsequent appeal untimely. People v. Campbell, 738 P.2d 1179 (Colo. 1987). Alleged errors must be preserved by ob- jection and motion. Proper procedure necessi- tates that alleged error, including errors of a constitutional nature, be preserved by raising same by objection during the trial and by mo- tion for a new trial. People v. Sanchez, 180 Colo. 119, 503 P.2d 619 (1972). Timely but defective notice was adequate to invoke appellate jurisdiction. People v. Bost, 770 P.2d 1209 (Colo. 1989). Perfection of appeal divests trial court of jurisdiction. Unless otherwise specifically au- thorized by statute or rule, once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court has no jurisdic- tion to issue further orders in the case relative to the order or judgment appealed from. Conse- quently, should it be necessary for the trial court to act, other than in aid of the appeal or pursu- ant to specific statutory authorization, the proper course would be for a party to obtain a limited remand from the appellate court. People v. Dillon, 655 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1982). Sentence imposed after revocation of pro- bation is final judgment. Where the trial court has initially imposed sentence on a defendant and has suspended execution of the sentence and granted probation, which is thereafter re- voked, the resulting sentence imposed after re- vocation of probation is the final judgment. People v. Jenkins, 40 Colo. App. 140, 575 P.2d 13 (1977). As is reversal of order imposing costs. The final judgment for purposes of appeal was en- tered when trial court reversed its previous or- der imposing costs on the defendant, and there- fore state’s appeal taken more than 30 days after sentencing was proper. People v. Fisher, 189 Colo. 297, 539 P.2d 1258 (1975). When the court vacates a sentence, the time to file an appeal starts to run from the date when the court imposes the new sen- tence. People v. Hunsaker, 2013 COA 5, 411 P.3d 36, aff’d, 2015 CO 46, 351 P.3d 388. Because § 16-12-102 (1) authorizes the people to appeal any decision of the trial court in a criminal case upon any question of law, section (b)(2) of this rule requires an appellate court to issue a written decision. People v. Wilburn, 2013 COA 135, 343 P.3d 998. IV. REVIEW OF SENTENCES. Misdemeanor sentence. There is no provi- sion for appellate review of the propriety of a misdemeanor sentence. People v. Roberts, 668 P.2d 977 (Colo. App. 1983). Sentencing by its very nature is a discre- tionary decision which requires the weighing of various factors and striking a fair accommo- dation between the defendant’s need for reha- bilitation or corrective treatment and society’s interest in safety and deterrence. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Wide latitude will be given the trial court’s final decision since it is in the best position to balance the many factors which must be consid- ered in tailoring an appropriate sentence in each individual case. People v. V alencia, 630 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981). But discretion not unrestricted. The discre- tion implicit in the sentencing decision is not an unrestricted discretion devoid of reason or prin- ciple. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Sentencing decisions should reflect ratio- nal selection from various sentencing alter- natives in a manner consistent with the domi- nant aims of the sentencing process. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Record to include reasons for imposition of sentence. Hereafter in felony convictions in- volving the imposition of a sentence to a cor- rectional facility, the sentencing judge must state on the record the basic reasons for the imposition of sentence. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). The statement of reasons that sentencing judge must state on record need not be lengthy, but should include the primary factual consider- ations bearing on the judge’s sentencing deci- sion. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). Factors considered in sentencing. Some of the more common considerations significant to the sentencing process are: The gravity of the offense in terms of harm to person or property; the gravity of the offense in terms of the culpa- bility requirement of the law; the defendant’s history of prior criminal conduct; the degree of danger the defendant might present to the com- munity if released forthwith; the likelihood of future criminality in the absence of corrective incarceration or treatment; the prospects for re- habilitation under some less drastic sentencing alternative, such as probation, and the likeli- hood of depreciating the seriousness of the of- fense were a less drastic sentencing alternative chosen. People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980). In reviewing the district court’s imposition of sentence, the supreme court is to consider the following factors: The nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the public interest in safety and deterrence, and the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which the sen- tence was based. People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1982). An appellate court must consider the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the public interest in safety and deterrence in reviewing a sentence claimed to be excessive. People v. V alencia, 630 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981). Review of propriety of sentence limited. Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court of Colorado has jurisdiction to review the propriety of a sentence except on direct appeal from the initial sentence, and then only under the limitations established in this rule and in § 18-1-409. Mikkleson v. People, 199 Colo. 319, 618 P.2d 1101 (1980). Record to justify extended term sentence. Where a sentence is imposed for an extended term, the record must clearly justify the deci- sion of the sentencing judge. People v. V alencia, 630 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1981). Sentence cannot be modified absent abuse of discretion. In reviewing the record in a pro- ceeding under this rule, the sentence imposed cannot be modified unless it appears to the appellate court that the trial judge abused his discretion in imposing the sentence. People v. Walker, 189 Colo. 545, 542 P.2d 1283 (1975). Trial court does not err in failing to hold hearing. When a defendant does not raise a question or move for a new trial, but raises the question for the first time on appeal of convic- tion, the trial court does not err in failing to hold a hearing ‘‘sua sponte’’ to determine such. People v. Sanchez, 180 Colo. 119, 503 P.2d 619 (1972). Invoking fifth amendment at codefen- dant’s trial. Where a defendant is appealing his sentence and fears that his testimony in the trial of his codefendant might be used at a subse- quent hearing to enhance the sentence should it be vacated, he may invoke his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. People v. Villa, 671 P.2d 971 (Colo. App. 1983). The language of section (b)(2) is plain and unambiguous and dictates that if an appeal by the People is authorized by statute, the court of appeals must issue a written decision. People v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 698 (Colo. App. 1998).