COLJI-Crim. H:74

The evidence presented in this case has raised the affirmative defense

of “emergency” as a defense to speeding.

The defendant’s conduct was legally authorized if:

1. the defendant’s speeding was necessary as an emergency

measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury, and

2. the injury was about to occur by reason of a situation

occasioned or developed through no conduct of the defendant,

and

3. the injury was of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary

standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and

urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweighed the

desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by

the statute prohibiting speeding.

The prosecution has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the defendant’s conduct was not legally authorized by this defense. In

order to meet this burden of proof, the prosecution must disprove, beyond

a reasonable doubt, at least one of the above numbered conditions.

After considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has

failed to meet this burden of proof, then the prosecution has failed to prove

the defendant’s conduct was not legally authorized by this defense, which

is an essential element of speeding. In that event, you must return a

verdict of not guilty of speeding.

After considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has

met this burden of proof, then the prosecution has proved the defendant’s

conduct was not legally authorized by this defense. In that event, your

verdict concerning the charge of speeding must depend upon your

determination whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof with

respect to the remaining elements of that offense.