CACI No. 4553

the employer beyond the boundaries of the compensation bargain, for which a

civil action may be brought.’ ” ( Gunnell v. Metrocolor Laboratories, Inc. (2001)

92 Cal.App.4th 710, 723 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 195], internal citations omitted.)

• “It has long been established in this jurisdiction that, generally speaking, a

defendant in a civil action who claims to be one of that class of persons

protected from an action at law by the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation

Act bears the burden of pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense to the

action, the existence of the conditions of compensation set forth in the statute

which are necessary to its application.” ( Doney, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 96,

internal citations and footnote omitted.)

• “California courts have held worker’s compensation proceedings to be the

exclusive remedy for certain third party claims deemed collateral to or derivative

of the employee’s injury. Courts have held that the exclusive jurisdiction

provisions bar civil actions against employers by nondependent parents of an

employee for the employee’s wrongful death, by an employee’s spouse for loss

of the employee’s services or consortium, and for emotional distress suffered by

a spouse in witnessing the employee’s injuries.” ( Snyder v. Michael’ s Stores, Inc.

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 991, 997 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 476, 945 P .2d 781], internal citations

omitted.)

• “ ‘An employer-employee relationship must exist in order to bring the . . . Act

into effect. (§ 3600)’ However, the coverage of the Act extends beyond those

who have entered into ‘traditional contract[s] of hire.’ ‘[S]ection 3351 provides

broadly that for the purpose of the . . . Act, “ ‘Employee’ means every person in

the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or

apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written . . . .’ ” Given this ‘section’s

explicit use of the disjunctive,’ a contract of hire is not ‘a prerequisite’ to the

existence of an employment relationship. Moreover, under section 3357, ‘[a]ny

CACI No. 2800 WORKERS’ COMPENSA TION

person rendering service for another, other than as an independent contractor, or

unless expressly excluded . . . , is presumed to be an employee.’ ” ( Arriaga v.

County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1060–1061 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 116, 892

P .2d 150], internal citations omitted.)

• “Given these broad statutory contours, we believe that an ‘employment’

relationship sufficient to bring the act into play cannot be determined simply

from technical contractual or common law conceptions of employment but must

instead be resolved by reference to the history and fundamental purposes

underlying the Workmen’s Compensation Act.” ( Laeng v. Workmen’ s Comp.

Appeals Bd. (1972) 6 Cal.3d 771, 777 [100 Cal.Rptr. 377, 494 P .2d 1], internal

citations omitted.)

• “[C]ourts generally are more exacting in requiring proof of an employment

relationship when such a relationship is asserted as a defense by the employer to

a common law action.” ( Spradlin v. Cox (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 799, 808 [247

Cal.Rptr. 347], internal citation omitted.)

• “The question of whether a person is an employee may be one of fact, of mixed

law and fact, or of law only. Where the facts are undisputed, the question is one

of law, and the Court of Appeal may independently review those facts to

determine the correct answer.” ( Barragan v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987)

195 Cal.App.3d 637, 642 [240 Cal.Rptr. 811], internal citations omitted.)

• “An employee may have more than one employer for purposes of workers’

compensation, and, in situations of dual employers, the second or ‘special’

employer may enjoy the same immunity from a common law negligence action

on account of an industrial injury as does the first or ‘general’ employer.

Identifying and analyzing such situations ‘is one of the most ancient and

complex questions of law in not only compensation but tort law.’ ” ( Santa Cruz

Poultry, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 575, 578 [239 Cal.Rptr.

578], internal citation omitted.)

• “In determining whether an employee is covered within the compensation system

and thus entitled to recover compensation benefits, the ‘definitional reach of

these covered employment relationships is very broad.’ A covered employee is

‘every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract

of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written.’ ‘Any person

rendering service for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless

expressly excluded herein, is presumed to be an employee.’ . . . [T]hese

provisions mandate a broad and generous interpretation in favor of inclusion in

the system. Necessarily the other side of that coin is a presumption against the

availability of a tort action where an employment relation exists. One result

cannot exist without the other. Further, this result does not depend upon

‘informed consent,’ but rather on the parties’ legal status. . . . [W]here the facts

of employment are not disputed, the existence of a covered relationship is a

question of law.” ( Santa Cruz Poultry, Inc., supra , 194 Cal.App.3d at pp.

583–584, internal citations omitted.)

• “ ‘The requirement of . . . section 3600 is twofold. On the one hand, the injury

WORKERS’ COMPENSA TION CACI No. 2800

must occur “in the course of the employment.” This concept “ordinarily refers to

the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurs.” Thus “ ‘[a]n

employee is in the “course of his employment” when he does those reasonable

things which his contract with his employment expressly or impliedly permits

him to do.’ ” And, ipso facto, an employee acts within the course of his

employment when “ ‘performing a duty imposed upon him by his employer and

one necessary to perform before the terms of the contract [are] mutually

satisfied.’ ” ’ [¶] ‘On the other hand, the statute requires that an injury “arise out

of” the employment. . . . It has long been settled that for an injury to “arise out

of the employment” it must “occur by reason of a condition or incident of [the]

employment . . . .” That is, the employment and the injury must be linked in

some causal fashion.’ ” ( LaTourette v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1998) 17

Cal.4th 644, 651 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 217, 951 P .2d 1184], internal citations and

footnote omitted.)

• “The requirements that an injury arise out of employment or be proximately

caused by employment are sometimes referred to together as the requirement of

industrial causation. It is a looser concept of causation than the concept of

proximate cause employed in tort law. In general, the industrial causation

requirement is satisfied ‘if the connection between work and the injury [is] a

contributing cause of the injury . . . .’ ” ( Lee v. West Kern Water Dist. (2016) 5

Cal.App.5th 606, 624 [210 Cal.Rptr.3d 362], internal citation omitted.)

• “For our purposes here, it is important that ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’

are two separate requirements. Even if it is conceded that an employee was

injured while performing job tasks in the workplace during working hours, the

exclusivity rule applies only if it also is shown that the work was a contributing

cause of the injury.” ( Lee, supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 625.)

• “The jury could properly make this finding [that conduct was not within scope

of employment] by applying special instruction No. 5, the instruction stating that

an employer’s conduct falls outside the workers’ compensation scheme when an

employer steps outside of its proper role or engages in conduct unrelated to the

employment. This instruction stated the doctrine of Fermino correctly.” ( Lee,

supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 628–629.)

• “The concept of ‘scope of employment’ in tort is more restrictive than the phrase

‘arising out of and in the course of employment,’ used in workers’

compensation.” ( Tognazzini v. San Luis Coastal Unified School Dist. (2001) 86

Cal.App.4th 1053, 1057 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 790], internal citations omitted.)

• “Whether an employee’s injury arose out of and in the course of her

employment is generally a question of fact to be determined in light of the

circumstances of the particular case. However, where the facts are undisputed,

resolution of the question becomes a matter of law.” ( Wright v. Beverly Fabrics,

Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 346, 353 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 503], internal citations

omitted.)

• “Injuries sustained while an employee is performing tasks within his or her

CACI No. 2800 WORKERS’ COMPENSA TION

employment contract but outside normal work hours are within the course of

employment. The rationale is that the employee is still acting in furtherance of

the employer’s business.” ( Wright, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 354.)